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 LIVE HEARINGS AND PAPER TRIALS 
MARK SPOTTSWOOD∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 This Article explores a constantly recurring procedural question: When is fact-finding 
improved by a live hearing or trial, and when would it be better to rely on a written record? 
Unfortunately, when judges, lawyers, and rulemakers consider this issue, they are led astray 
by the widely shared—but false—assumption that a judge can best determine issues of cred-
ibility by viewing the demeanor of witnesses while they are testifying. In fact, a large body of 
scientific evidence indicates that judges are more likely to be deceived by lying or mistaken 
witnesses when observing live testimony than if the judges were to review a paper transcript. 
Witness presence, in other words, may often harm, rather than improve, the accuracy of cred-
ibility assessments. The fact that legal actors value hearings for mistaken reasons does not 
mean that hearings have no value, but it does raise the concern that live procedure will be 
employed when it is unneeded or even counterproductive, especially given the lack of avail-
able guidance on this question. In this Article, I attempt to remedy this problem by suggest-
ing some guiding principles that lawyers, courts, and rulemakers could rely on when choos-
ing between live and paper-based fact-finding.  
 Live hearings and trials will often, but not always, do more harm than good. In addition 
to the fact that demeanor cues generally impair credibility judgments, there are a number of 
cognitive biases that may arise from having one’s first impressions of a witness be visual and 
auditory impressions. These include a persistent human tendency to trust or distrust wit-
nesses based on their physical attractiveness, their social status, their race, or other features 
that may make them similar to, or different than, the fact-finder. On the flip side, live fact-
finding may help a judge make sense of confusing evidence. In addition, in-court hearings 
may feel fairer to participants than paper-based decisions, due in large part to the desire to 
have expressive input in decisions that affect their well-being. And occasionally, a live hear-
ing or trial may be preferable for reasons of cost or practicality. 
 A better understanding of the costs and benefits of live fact-finding could have profound 
implications for the design of our civil justice system. Our current approach relies on pre-
dominantly paper-based, pretrial fact-finding, followed in rare cases by a live trial process. 
Unfortunately, this system uses paper-based procedures at a point when live hearings may 
often be cheaper and more reliable, then shifts to live examination when its benefits will 
have evaporated and its costs are likely to be prohibitive. A preferable system would allow 
for more live hearings early in a case. Even when there is no direct credibility conflict, live 
proof at this stage may increase the legitimacy of rulings, may lower litigation costs, and 
will often be more reliable than the paper-based alternative of affidavit evidence. By con-
trast, rulemakers should be more willing to authorize—and judges should be more willing to 
use—paper trials at the final fact-finding stage of a dispute. At this late stage, live procedure 
is expensive and unreliable, and as a result litigants use it so rarely that it provides them 
with few opportunities for self-expression. In short, we should reverse our present approach 
to civil case fact-finding by holding more live pretrial hearings and more paper trials. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 In American civil procedure, some of our metaphors draw heavily 
on a shared cultural image: the viva voce civil jury trial. If we wish to 
say that a litigant has a right to exercise some personal control over 
the presentation of arguments and evidence in a proceeding that 
might affect her rights, we say that she has the right to her “day in 
court”1—even though the vast majority of cases are resolved by set-
tlement or by pretrial motion, rather than by a trial.2 Likewise, when 
we refer to a person’s due process rights to present evidence and 
make arguments to a court, we say that she has a right “to be 
heard,”3 even though the litigant (and even her counsel) may participate 
in those proceedings by many other means than speaking to the court. 
 The language of procedure is permeated with a presumption of 
presence—a default assumption that adjudication of a dispute re-
quires the physical, visual, and aural immediacy furnished by a tra-
ditional trial environment. This assumption persists despite the fact 
that many case resolutions occur via motion practice or private set-
tlement negotiations that deviate widely from the traditional model 
                                                            
 1. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999); 18A CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
4449 (2d ed. 2002). 
 2.  See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related 
Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 482-84 (2004); Gilli-
an K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial Adjudications, and 
Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 705, 730 tbl.7 (2004); see also Ronald J. Allen, Laudan, Stein, and the Limits 
of Theorizing About Juridical Proof, 29 L. & PHIL. 195, 207-08 (2010) (book review) (charac-
terizing trials as an oddity reserved for those “perverse” cases in which the ordinary means 
of dispute resolution have failed).  
 3.  See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985).  
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of a live trial.4 Once we have noticed this default assumption, a ques-
tion presents itself: How well is the legal system served by a proce-
dural mindset that automatically equates “in person” procedures 
with “fair” procedures?  
 I aim to explore that question in this Article, by assessing the 
costs and benefits of live hearings and trials in the resolution of civil 
disputes.5 It is a question that legal decisionmakers must answer im-
plicitly on a nearly constant basis—to the extent that the question 
becomes a form of legal white noise. The litigating attorney must decide 
whether to ask for an evidentiary hearing or whether to seek a live 
trial; the judge must decide when to grant one or proceed on a paper 
record instead; the rulemaker must decide what (if any) rules are 
necessary to guide the judge’s discretion. Each time, someone is rely-
ing on a set of assumptions about whether the presence of the parties 
and the sights and sounds of live testimony are a help or a hindrance. 
And precisely because legal actors must so often decide what value to 
place on in-person procedures, any defects in their decisionmaking in 
this area are likely to be magnified when seen from a distance. Small 
introductions of error or dissatisfaction—aggregated across the entire 
system—may lead to large-scale inefficiencies or inequities. 
 Despite the frequent affirmation of the value of presence in the 
fact-finding process by legal thinkers, we shall see that live hearings 
and trials sometimes aid, but often hinder, the fair adjudication of 
disputes. In the sections that follow, I aim to establish the following 
propositions. First, legal decisionmakers are regularly forced to de-
cide whether live procedure is useful in a particular circumstance or 
in a particular class of cases. But despite the ubiquity of this ques-
tion, the utility of such presence is poorly understood by judges and 
under-theorized by academics. Most judges assume that live hearings 
increase accuracy by adding the demeanor of witnesses into the in-
formational environment, thereby increasing their ability to tell 
whether a witness is being deceptive or inaccurate. But in fact, de-
meanor cues are more likely to mislead judges than to edify them; 
demeanor, in other words, is a tool that liars use to appear more 
credible. Moreover, live testimony introduces other sources of bias 
                                                            
 4.  See ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL 82-83 (2009). Burns 
describes the radical decline in the number of federal cases that are resolved by a trial, from 
approximately twenty-five percent of cases at the beginning of the twentieth century to less 
than two percent today. Id. A similar decline has occurred in state practice. Id. at 85-86.  
 5.  Similar questions could profitably be asked in a variety of related legal contexts. 
Live procedures are the norm for the resolution of criminal disputes, and they are quite 
common in the administrative agency context. In both arenas such procedures may be sub-
ject to the same difficulties I discuss infra concerning civil case fact-finding, although 
unique cost considerations and expectations concerning fairness in such settings would 
require considerable additional analysis. The decision to limit the inquiry to the civil 
procedure context, therefore, flows primarily from a desire to keep this discussion to a 
manageable scope. 
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that may lead decisionmaking astray. Viewing a witness in person 
may encourage a judge to unconsciously credit or distrust testimony 
based on factors that have little to do with accuracy, including a de-
sire to affiliate with high status or attractive witnesses or an innate 
tendency to trust witnesses who are members of one’s own social in-
group more than members of an out-group. 
 But this does not mean that live procedures are without value. 
Despite the concerns expressed above, live testimony can aid in accu-
rate decisionmaking if it adds factual information that would be ab-
sent from a paper record—such as through a successful cross-
examination of a poorly prepared witness. Furthermore, live fact-
finding may sometimes be a lower-cost method of deciding a dispute, 
depending on the state of the evidentiary record when a decision 
must be made. Live procedures also have “softer” values that the le-
gal system cannot afford to ignore: They are part of a process that 
signals to litigants that the legal system respects their dignity as 
persons even when it rejects their arguments. Such signals are an 
important way that the legal system projects an aura of legitimacy 
and thereby obtains public compliance with the law.   
 Ultimately, to decide whether a live or a paper-based procedure is 
preferable in a given situation, we should weigh these concerns of 
objective accuracy, subjective legitimacy, and cost against each other. 
By doing so, we shall see that many standard assumptions about 
when hearings are useful and when they are not are probably flawed, 
and that these flawed assumptions have resulted in a perverse set of 
practices in civil litigation. For instance, we regularly employ paper 
procedures early in a case but almost uniformly prefer live trials for 
the final fact-finding process. But attending to the costs and benefits 
of presence shows that this preference is very nearly the opposite of a 
sensible balance between accuracy, legitimacy, and cost considera-
tions. Early in the life of a case, holding a live hearing may add reli-
ability to fact-finding at little expense, particularly when the alterna-
tive is affidavit proof. After a lengthy pretrial process, however, the 
considerations are inverted: well-prepared witnesses can frustrate 
what few truth-seeking advantages a live trial may provide, while 
the high-costs and uncertainty of that procedure will induce many 
parties to settle and thereby lose the opportunity to argue the merits 
of their cases to a court. In other words, instead of our current habit 
of conducting paper motion practice followed (rarely) by a live trial, a 
more sensible approach would be to hold more live evidentiary hear-
ings early in the life of a case, followed by a paper trial if the parties 
cannot settle. 
 This Article will proceed in five parts. First, I will attempt to show 
the relevance of the question under discussion by illustrating the 
ways that practitioners, judges, and rulemakers depend on their abil-
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ity to accurately assess the value of live testimony. Second, I will dis-
cuss the costs and benefits that live procedures can impose on our 
ability to reach accurate determinations in the face of conflicting evi-
dence. Third, I will examine the normative and practical factors that 
may counsel in favor of live testimony, even when it might add inac-
curacy or expense. Fourth, I will discuss the effect of live hearings 
and trials on litigation costs. Fifth, I will attempt to demonstrate how 
these concerns play out in several real-world situations in which 
judges must evaluate the utility of in-person procedures. Using these 
examples, I will then suggest a proposed reform to the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure that would strike a better balance between live 
and paper-based fact-finding. 
II.   A TALE OF THREE DECISIONMAKERS 
 The question explored in this Article—whether a live hearing or 
trial will be an aid or a hindrance to decisionmaking in a given con-
text—has relevance for participants at every level of the legal sys-
tem. Lawyers must rely on a theory of live procedure (even if it is an 
implicit one) in order to make many decisions regarding litigation 
strategy. Likewise, judges are often called upon to decide whether 
live testimony is valuable in the context of a particular case, and pro-
cedural rulemakers must make more general decisions about the 
utility of viva voce procedures for particular types of judicial deci-
sions. Often, the decisionmaker in question may not realize that a 
value-laden choice is being made, in part because the decision is one 
that is made so routinely. But the very ubiquity of the decision 
means that small errors in assessing the costs and benefits of live 
procedures can be magnified into substantial problems when viewed 
from a systemic perspective. 
 A lawyer must decide how much value she places on in-person 
procedure at the very outset of litigation. For one thing, she must de-
cide whether she wishes to demand a jury trial.6 In making this deci-
sion, one important consideration is how much value she places on a 
live trial. In bench-trial cases, courts will sometimes agree to employ 
a paper trial procedure in which they reach a decision based only on 
a paper record, dispensing with a live trial.7 No parallel practice ex-
ists with respect to jury-trial cases, however. So, our hypothetical at-
torney makes an implicit decision regarding the value of viva voce 
presentation when she decides whether or not to seek a trial by jury 
                                                            
 6.  See U.S. CONST. amend. VII; FED. R. CIV. P. 38(b) (requiring that a demand be 
made within fourteen days of the last relevant pleading in federal court cases). 
 7.  See, e.g., Muller v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 341 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2003); Lac 
Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983). 
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and (if she has waived a jury trial) later in the case when she decides 
whether to seek a paper trial.8 
 Furthermore, our lawyer will reprise this decision many times 
during her lawsuit. The federal rules of procedure and evidence 
require judges to make many non-dispositive findings of fact in ad-
vance of trial. For instance, a judge in a civil case may need to decide 
whether to grant a preliminary injunction,9 whether to certify a class 
action,10 whether to compel arbitration,11 or whether to admit scien-
tific evidence.12 However, because a court will often have discretion 
as to whether or not it needs to hold a hearing in order to make such 
decisions,13 an attorney has the option of asking the court to do 
its pretrial fact-finding on the basis of either an oral hearing or a 
written record.   
 Judges, of course, are forced to address these concerns as well. In 
some cases the choice between live procedures and paper procedures 
will have been made for them. For instance, a judge has no discretion 
to deny a jury trial once demanded by a party in a proper case.14 Sim-
ilarly, local rules or circuit precedent may constrain the ability of 
judges to make pretrial findings of fact in the manner of their choos-
ing.15 But often, a judge will have no authority to rely upon, and in
                                                            
 8.  To dispel any confusion, I must make clear that the value of in-person procedure is 
only one of many factors that will or should bear on the jury-trial-waiver question. For 
example, in some cases, lawyers may believe that a jury will view their case more favorably 
than a judge would—or vice versa. Likewise, lawyers may prefer a live bench trial over a 
live jury trial for cost reasons, without regard to the possible availability of a paper trial 
procedure. And it is quite possible that litigators who specialize in subject matters in which 
paper trials are very rare may be unaware of the device’s existence and thus fail to realize 
that a choice about the jury trial issue has this additional implication. 
 9.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a). See also Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 392 
(1981) (describing the findings of fact necessary to support a preliminary injunction). 
 10.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 11.  See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006). 
 12.  See FED. R. EVID. 702. Similar situations may arise in many other forums, of 
course. In a criminal case, for instance, fact-finding may be necessary to support a decision 
regarding pretrial detention or suppression of evidence, and judges may have discretion in 
such settings regarding the manner in which proof will be taken. See, e.g., 1A CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT & ANDREW D. LEIPOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 194 (4th ed. 
2008) (suppression hearings). Likewise, arbitration and administrative law procedures 
may often grant non-judicial fact-finders the authority to decide whether or not a hearing 
will be useful. 
 13.  See, e.g., 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1785 (3d ed. 2005) (class action certification); 9 U.S.C. § 6 (2006) 
(motion to compel arbitration in non-jury-demand cases); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & 
LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, 3 FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 7:17 (3d ed. 2007) (Daubert inquiry). 
 14.  See U.S. CONST. amend. VII; FED. R. CIV. P. 38. 
 15.  See, e.g., Merrill v. S. Methodist Univ., 806 F.2d 600, 608 (5th Cir. 1986) (noting 
that Fifth Circuit precedent requires district courts to hold evidentiary hearings whenever 
a class certification is not “free from doubt”). 
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stead she will be forced to weigh the costs and benefits of a live pro-
ceeding without guidance.16 
 Judges may be relying on implicit assumptions about the value of 
viva voce procedure even when the issue is not explicitly presented. 
Quite often, a judge might find that a case falls within a zone of am-
biguity when applying a rule that may either dispose of that case, or 
allow it to proceed to a bench or jury trial.17 For instance, consider a 
motion for summary judgment in which a judge is unsure whether 
the parties have created a material dispute of fact, perhaps because 
the submissions of the parties are somewhat vague as to key points of 
evidence.18 When legal questions become close, policy judgments may 
begin to play a larger role in the decisionmaking.19 In such a position, 
a judge might be influenced by her assumptions as to whether the 
additional proceedings are likely to improve the accuracy of the case’s 
outcome or merely take up extra judicial time. Thus, a judge might 
end up granting summary judgment based on a view that live testi-
mony will materially aid her subsequent decisionmaking or deny it 
based on a view that a live trial will be long on expense but short on 
new information. 
 Similarly, judges regularly review the work of other judges and 
decisionmakers, sometimes within a single court system (as in the 
case of a direct appeal) and sometimes across institutional lines (as 
in the case of administrative review). In this context, they often must 
apply rules of deference, which instruct them to give extra weight to 
decisions that follow a hearing.20 Such rules are necessarily under-
                                                            
 16.  Compare Gingras v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 06 C 2195, 2007 WL 1052500, 
at *7 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 4, 2007) (declining to try a case on a paper record despite the parties’ 
stipulation to such a procedure), with Migliorisi v. Walgreens Disability Benefits Plan, No. 
06 C 3290, 2008 WL 904883, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2008) (employing a paper-based deci-
sion procedure in a case involving credibility disputes). 
 17.  For example, summary judgment decisions may often hinge on whether a particu-
lar dispute is characterized as a question of fact, which a court must view “ ‘in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party,’ ” Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2677 (2009) 
(quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)), or a question of law, to which no such 
rule of restraint applies. Deciding whether a particular dispute is one of fact, of law, or the 
application of law to fact will often involve a surprising amount of practical judicial discre-
tion, given that “ ‘the journey from a pure question of fact to a pure question of law is one of 
subtle gradations rather than one marked by a rigid divide.’ ” Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. 
Hyundai Merchant Marine Co., Ltd. 63 F.3d 1227, 1235 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting United 
States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165, 171 n.4 (1984)). 
 18.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
 19.  See Ward Farnsworth, Dustin F. Guzior & Anup Malani, Ambiguity About Ambi-
guity: An Empirical Inquiry into Legal Interpretation, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 257, 271-72 
(2010) (noting that, when a legal text may be read as “ambiguous” in some senses but not 
in others, interpreters may be influenced by policy preferences when deciding whether to 
call it “ambiguous” or “clear”).  
 20.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006) (“The findings of the Commissioner of Social 
Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive” upon re-
view in an action in federal court to set aside the Commissioner’s decision); 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(b)(4)(B) (providing that, when a court of appeals reviews an immigration decision, 
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determinative; they can tell judges to defer, but they cannot say ex-
actly when deference must give way to the reviewing court’s own 
judgment in a particular case. The gap must be filled by recourse to 
judicial judgment, and that judgment will be informed, either implic-
itly or explicitly,21 by the reviewing court’s impression of the value of 
the differing vantage point of the first court. 
 Finally, rulemakers (whether acting as rule drafters22 or when vot-
ing to approve or reject proposed rules23) must wrestle with these 
concerns as well. In some instances, they take explicit stances re-
garding the value of viva voce procedure. For example, Civil Rule 
52(a)(6) admonishes appellate courts to defer to trial-court findings of 
fact and pay “due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the 
witnesses’ credibility,”24 which is, in effect, a codification of the as-
sumption that in-person proceedings are likely to be more accurate 
than a review of the record. But it is not only such explicit state-
ments that implicate the value of live procedure. Even silence regard-
ing the method by which facts should be communicated to a court in-
volves at least an implicit understanding that neither live nor paper 
procedure is so much more reliable that it should be mandated as a 
general means of proceeding. 
 In theory, rulemakers can require live hearings, forbid them, or 
leave the decision to the discretion of judges. Most often, the rules 
say nothing with respect to whether hearings are preferred to paper 
decisionmaking, which is effectively an election in favor of the third 
option. By saying nothing, a rulemaker signals one of two things: ei-
ther the decision is not important enough to warrant a rule, or an ex 
ante rule is likely to be of lower quality than a contextualized exer-
cise of judicial discretion. Either way, however, a committee making 
                                                                                                                                           
“the administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would 
be compelled to conclude to the contrary”); FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (instructing “reviewing 
court[s] [to] . . . give due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ cred-
ibility” and to affirm trial court findings unless they are “clearly erroneous”). But cf. FED. 
R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3) (requiring district judges to give fresh consideration to the pretrial fact-
finding of a magistrate judge). 
 21.  Cf. Mitondo v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 784, 787-88 (7th Cir. 2008) (providing an un-
usually nuanced assessment of the differing perspectives and capabilities of an immigration 
judge and an appellate court with respect to determinations of an asylum applicant’s credibility). 
 22.  See Paul J. Stancil, Close Enough for Government Work: The Committee Rulemak-
ing Game, 96 VA. L. REV. 69, 76-78 (2010) (describing the rulemaking process established 
by 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (2006), which delegates the drafting of rules to advisory committees 
made up of delegates from the federal bench of bar, and noting that in practice, the draft-
ing of rules often involves a dialogue between these advisory committees and the Federal 
Judicial Conference’s Standing Committee on Rules of Practice, Procedure, and Evidence). 
 23.  See id. at 107-08 (noting that the proposed rules drafted by an advisory committee 
must pass through a number of veto gates, and that the Standing Committee, the Judicial 
Conference, the Supreme Court, and Congress all have the ability to stop a rule from going 
into effect). 
 24.  FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6).  
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rules that govern the litigation environment must constantly take 
some sort of stand as to either the value of presence specifically, or 
the superiority of judges in determining the best decisionmaking en-
vironment for each particular case context. 
 Because so many actors, at so many levels of the legal system, 
must regularly decide how useful live procedures are, even a small 
upgrade to their ability to accurately weigh the relevant costs and 
benefits can have large consequences when aggregated across the 
litigation system. Unfortunately, however, such decisions are often 
made unreflectively, from the gut and (in part because of the relative 
silence of rulemakers) without much guidance from authoritative 
sources. As a result, we have little reason to be confident that the av-
erage legal actor’s concept of live procedure’s advantages and disad-
vantages is well tuned. Indeed, as we shall see, close attention to this 
question shows that judges and rulemakers regularly rely on intui-
tions that are at best dubious, and at worst factually false, when 
thinking about these questions. 
III.   OBJECTIVE FAIRNESS:  THE ACCURACY VALUE 
 Few values are as fundamental to our system of adjudication as 
accuracy—the interest in reaching outcomes that correctly describe 
past events.25 For this reason, when a judge or rulemaker must decide 
whether to hear live evidence on a particular topic, the focus is often 
on whether doing so is likely to produce a more accurate decision. 
Unfortunately, some of the intuitions on which the legal system re-
lies regarding the relationship between live testimony and accuracy 
are not sound. Although it is often presumed that a live hearing or 
trial generally makes a decision more accurate, the reality is that 
judges will often render less accurate decisions after watching live 
testimony than they would if they had relied on a paper record instead. 
A.   Judicial Intuitions Concerning the Value of Demeanor Evidence 
 One of the most frequently expressed intuitions regarding the util-
ity of viva voce procedures is that they aid fact-finders in determining 
whether witnesses are testifying credibly. This assumption has a 
long history in the law. At one time, the superiority of visual exami-
nation seemed so obvious that many courts refused to seat blind peo-
ple as jurors: “[S]urely,” reflected one court, “no one who cannot see 
                                                            
 25.  See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (noting that preventing 
“the risk of an erroneous deprivation” of a legal interest is a key component of the constitu-
tional right to due process); Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 
183 (2004) (noting that procedural justice is “concerned with the benefits of accuracy”); cf. 
ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE IN A SOCIAL WORLD 59-68 (1999) (defending the notion 
that a statement is true if it successfully describes events in the world). 
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the expression of faces, nor observe deportment and demeanor, can 
justly weigh testimony.”26 Dean Wigmore, in his treatise on judicial 
proof, endorsed a similar principle: “[N]o intentional derogation from 
the truth can take place without a tendency to muscular contractions 
or expansions,— phenomena of inhibition or excitation.”27   
 This belief has gained wide purchase in American law.28 One au-
thor, discussing the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, noted 
that “[t]here is . . . a secondary advantage to be obtained by the per-
sonal appearance of the witness: the judge and the jury are enabled 
to obtain the elusive and incommunicable evidence of a witness’ de-
portment while testifying . . . .”29 Such views persist today: The Su-
preme Court has suggested that a witness, when facing a live defen-
dant, may be “confound[ed]” and reveal his deceptive intent through 
visual cues, such as “studiously” avoiding the defendant’s gaze.30 
Guided by such considerations, the Second Circuit has suggested that 
the right of confrontation is impaired when jurors cannot see a wit-
ness’s eyes, but that such defects can be mitigated if they can at least 
observe a witness’s “body language.”31    
 This idea is also firmly ensconced in the relationship between an 
initial fact-finder and a subsequent reviewing court. In the direct ap-
peal process, reviewing courts are advised to “give due regard to the 
trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”32 Like-
wise, when reviewing the work of administrative fact-finders, courts 
often give special weight to the initial findings of a hearing officer, 
even if his conclusions were dismissed by his administrative superi-
ors following an administrative appeal. The reasoning follows a fa-
miliar refrain: The Supreme Court noted that hearing officers, but 
not their superiors, had the “opportunity to observe the witnesses” at 
a hearing.33 For this reason, when an agency disagrees with one of its 
hearing officers, its findings may be subject to extra scrutiny depend-
ing in part on the “importance of credibility in the particular case.”34 
 Similarly, courts have focused on a witness’s appearance as a 
guide to accuracy as well as sincerity. Many courts refuse to allow 
                                                            
 26.  Rhodes v. State, 27 N.E. 866, 868 (Ind. 1891). 
 27.  JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROOF 493 (2d ed. 1931) (quot-
ing G.L. DUPRAT, LE MESONGE: ETUDE DE PSYCHOLOGIE (2d ed. 1909))(emphasis omitted). 
 28.  But cf. Mitondo v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 784, 788 (7th Cir. 2008) (providing what 
may be the only significant counterexample to the judicial trend approving of the probative 
value of demeanor evidence as a credibility signal). 
 29.  5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1395 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) (emphasis omitted). 
 30.  See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019-20 (1988).  
 31.  Morales v. Artuz, 281 F.3d 55, 60-62 (2d Cir. 2002) (concluding that a witness 
could testify while wearing dark sunglasses without violating the Confrontation Clause, so 
long as the jury could observe other aspects of her demeanor). 
 32.  FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6). 
 33.  Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 492-97 (1951). 
 34.  Id. at 496. 
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experts to testify regarding the baseline reliability of eyewitness tes-
timony, 35 and demeanor evidence provides a central part of the justi-
fication for excluding such evidence. For instance, in rejecting expert 
testimony that eyewitness confidence was rarely predictive of eye-
witness accuracy, the Second Circuit opined that “assessing witness 
credibility” was a fundamental part of a jury’s role, that a jury could 
rely upon “a witness’s demeanor on the stand, including his or her 
confidence” in order to assess the reliability of an identification, and 
that the proffered expert testimony would intrude on this special role 
of the jury.36  
 This view is articulated most directly when judges consider 
whether it is appropriate to hold a trial “on the papers” by the con-
sent of the parties. In his article advocating an expanded use of this 
device, Magistrate Judge Denlow issued a word of caution: “In an in-
stance when a credibility determination is at the heart of the case, a 
waiver of the right to bring in live witnesses does not make sense” 
because “a judge . . . can best decide credibility by seeing the wit-
ness.”37 This view has been echoed by other judges: In a case where 
the parties “place great weight on the credibility of their own doctors 
in contrast to the alleged bias of the other party’s physicians,” one 
district court judge decided to hold a hearing despite the fact that 
both parties preferred a paper trial, stating that “[i]t simply is not 
possible for the Court to make the credibility determinations the par-
ties argue are necessary by reviewing only the paper record.”38   
B.   The Reality:  Demeanor Evidence Undercuts the Accuracy of  
Credibility Judgments 
 Unfortunately, the widespread assumption that fact-finders can 
improve their credibility assessments by attending to demeanor is 
false. In fact, demeanor evidence is a poor tool for detecting either 
deliberate deception or mistaken recollection. A substantial body of 
social science evidence indicates that visually observing witnesses at 
best contributes nothing to a credibility determination and at worst 
increases the likelihood that a fact-finder will get it wrong.39   
                                                            
 35.  See Richard A. Wise et al., How to Analyze the Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony 
in a Criminal Case, 42 CONN. L. REV. 435, 452-54 (2009); 31A AM. JUR. 2D Expert and 
Opinion Evidence § 337 n.4 (2010) (collecting state cases excluding such evidence). 
 36.  United States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280, 289 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Arnstein v. 
Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 471-72 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 37.  Morton Denlow, Trial on the Papers: An Alternative to Cross-Motions for Summary 
Judgment, FED. LAW., August 1999, at 30, 32. 
 38.  Gingras v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 06 C 2195, 2007 WL 1052500, at *7 
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 4, 2007). 
 39.  See generally Charles F. Bond, Jr. & Bella M. DePaulo, Accuracy of Deception 
Judgments, 10 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 214 (2006) (collecting and analyzing 
over 200 deception studies). 
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 Studies consistently show that the average person’s success rate 
in detecting a lie while watching the liar is little better than chance. 
Nor is this situation greatly changed by expertise. Most law enforce-
ment officials, mental health professionals, and (most pertinent to 
the current investigation) judges can detect a lie based on visual cues 
at levels only slightly exceeding chance.40   
 At first blush, this information may seem counterintuitive to 
many. It may seem natural to assume that we are good at detecting 
lies. Indeed, we depend upon this skill to a great extent in our every-
day lives, in that we assume we would be able to tell if we were being 
deceived. The problem, however, is that liars can easily introspect on 
the cues that they would look for to determine sincerity, and fake 
them. Most people tell lies at least once each day,41 thereby getting 
the opportunity to practice the skills of duplicity in numerous, rela-
tively low-risk acts of social deception. As a result, the average per-
son is a better feigner of sincerity than detector of sincerity. One pair 
                                                            
 40.  Id. at 229-30 (concluding, in a meta-analysis of over 200 deception studies, that 
both experts and non-experts have an accuracy rate below fifty-five percent, with no sig-
nificant gain being realized by expertise); Paul Ekman & Maureen O’Sullivan, Who Can 
Catch a Liar?, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 913, 916 (1991) (examining a number of occupations, 
including judges, polygraphists, robbery investigators, Secret Service agents, and psychia-
trists, and finding an accuracy rate of approximately fifty-five percent for all groups except 
the Secret Service, who had a slightly higher accuracy rate of sixty-four percent). Ekman 
and O’Sullivan later conducted a study that purported to show that experts could achieve 
heightened levels of accuracy; this study selected groups of experts (including psycholo-
gists, judges, and law enforcement investigators), some of whom had “special interest or 
expertise” in detecting deception and who had attended special workshops on detecting 
deception. See Paul Ekman, Maureen O’Sullivan, & Mark G. Frank, A Few Can Catch a 
Liar, 10 PSYCHOL. SCI. 263, 263–64 (1999). This study found accuracy rates as high as sev-
enty-three percent (among federal officers with special deception-detection experience who 
had attended a day-long workshop on the topic), and other deception-interested groups who 
had attended such workshops also showed detection rates above sixty percent (local sher-
iffs, federal judges, and clinical psychologists). Id. at 265. Subsequent investigators have 
cautioned, however, that the “results of these training studies are mixed,” with some stud-
ies showing a training improvement, others showing no effects, and still others showing 
that training actually impairs lie detection. Aldert Vrij, Criteria-Based Content Analysis: A 
Qualitative Review of the First 37 Studies, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 3, 22-23 (2005); see 
also Maureen O’Sullivan et al., Police Lie Detection Accuracy: The Effect of Lie Scenario, 33 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 530, 534 (2009) (reanalyzing twenty-three studies involving law en-
forcement officers’ attempts to detect deception and finding that officers outperformed nov-
ice lie-detectors, showing sixty-four percent accuracy as compared with fifty-five percent 
among the novices, when the truth/lie sample involved “high stakes” for the deceiver in a 
manner similar to what an officer would encounter in a real-world interview scenario); 
Saul M. Kassin & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions: A Review of the Lit-
erature and Issues, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. IN THE PUB. INT. 33, 38 (2004) (describing studies in 
which training lowered the quality of deception judgments while raising the confidence of 
the trained subjects that their judgments were correct). The overall picture appears to be 
consistent with the Bond, Jr. & DePaulo meta-analysis: Neither lie-detection training nor 
professional experience with lie-detection are reliably associated with accuracy improve-
ments. See Bond, Jr. & DePaulo, supra note 39. 
 41.  See Mark G. Frank, Thoughts, Feelings, and Deception, in DECEPTION: FROM AN-
CIENT EMPIRES TO INTERNET DATING 55, 56 (Brook Harrington ed., 2009) (noting that “when 
people keep diaries of their lies, they report telling one to two falsified accounts each day”). 
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of researchers, summarizing their meta-analysis of existing studies, 
framed the problem as follows: 
[While] lay people believe that certain nonverbal behaviors are 
strongly associated with deception . . . these beliefs are actually di-
ametrically opposed to those observed to be indicators of deception 
in experimental studies. For example, although people generally 
believe that deception is accompanied by an increase in hand 
movements as well as in foot and leg movements and nodding, the-
se behaviors actually decrease when people are lying. . . . [Al-
though] people assume that blinks, illustrators, and postural shifts 
increase when people are lying, . . . there seems to be no associa-
tion with these behaviors in this meta-analysis. Only for some be-
haviors do beliefs match the direction of the associations ob-
served—perhaps a decrease in (genuine) smiles. Nonetheless, even 
with these behaviors, the magnitude of the association is assumed 
to be much stronger than it actually is . . . .42 
In short, most of us do not know what to look for to visually detect 
deception, and we have not yet developed reliable training methods 
that overcome this limitation. 
 The story is equally grim when we consider testimony that is not 
outright deceptive, but rather mistaken. “Numerous studies have 
[shown] . . . that subject jurors are unable to do better than chance in 
distinguishing between accurate and inaccurate eyewitness identifi-
cations, and that the jurors accord inappropriate weight to witness 
confidence.”43 Simply stated, the problem is that people tend to over-
rely on witness confidence as a proxy for witness accuracy. Unfortu-
nately, confidence appears to be poorly correlated with accuracy in 
                                                            
 42.  Siegfried L. Sporer & Barbara Schwandt, Moderators of Nonverbal Indicators of 
Deception: A Meta-Analytic Synthesis, 13 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1, 26 (2007); see also 
Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of the Hands, a Lick of the Lips: The Validity of Demeanor 
Evidence in Assessing Witness Credibility, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1157, 1165-66 (1993) (discussing 
physical signals that have been thought indicative of lying); Richard L. Marcus, Complet-
ing Equity’s Conquest? Reflections on the Future of Trial Under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 725, 758 (1989) (noting that judges and juries may misinter-
pret the nervousness of truth-telling witnesses as a symptom of deception “because of de-
meanor evidence that is misunderstood”). 
 43.  Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1089 (1991) (also 
listing studies); see VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 128 (1986). Nor 
does the situation improve when real attorneys are recruited to subject the mistaken wit-
nesses to cross-examination. In one study, 178 participants viewed mock trials in which 
accurate and inaccurate witnesses were subjected to the full panoply of examination, cross-
examination, and redirect examination, without time limit. R.C.L. Lindsay, Gary L. Wells, 
& Fergus O’Connor, Mock-Juror Belief of Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses: A Replica-
tion and Extension, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 333, 335 (1989). The results were unset-
tling: Mock jurors who heard eyewitness testimony voted seventy-two percent of the time 
to convict the identified person of a “crime,” and even where eyewitnesses were discredited, 
sixty-eight percent of mock jurors voted to support conviction of the mis-identified person. 
See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 43, at 128. 
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testimony, so this reliance leads us astray.44 It seems reasonable to 
worry that fact-finders would make a similar error when assessing 
other examples of inaccurate, but confident, witness testimony. 
C.   Addressing the Demeanor-Evidence Problem 
 Scholars who have confronted this disparity between judicial as-
sumptions and cognitive reality have mainly fallen into two camps. 
Some have attempted to find ways to minimize the degree of error 
induced by reliance on demeanor from the hearing process. Jeremy 
Blumenthal, for example, urges that the problem could be partially 
overcome by hiding witnesses behind screens, or else by instructing 
juries to base credibility judgments on what a witness says and the 
way in which they say it, but not on how they appear while speak-
ing.45 But this advice has limited utility for two reasons: First, Blu-
menthal relies significantly on the assumption that tone of voice is a 
“leaky” channel, which will betray deceptive intent despite the at-
tempts of liars to conceal their emotional state.46 But a meta-analysis 
of deception-detection studies indicates that judges who rely on audio 
recordings in trying to detect lies do not significantly out-perform 
those who rely only on transcripts.47 There is little reason to think, 
therefore, that the vocal presence of witnesses will make a trial-
behind-a-screen more accurate than a trial-on-the-papers. Second, by 
focusing almost entirely on the jury trial environment, Blumenthal 
looks at a context that is both limiting (because the Seventh Amend-
ment and tradition constrain decisionmakers from dispensing with 
presence) and rare (because very few cases are disposed of by jury 
trial in the modern system).48 So he does not ask the question ex-
plored here: Do the limits of demeanor evidence undercut the accu-
racy rationale for taking live testimony altogether? 
 Some scholars have addressed this question, although they have 
focused primarily on the trial environment, rather than the wider 
variety of situations in which a hearing might be employed to help a 
court reach a decision. Max Minzner responds to the demeanor deficit 
by noting that “[w]hile liars do not give off demeanor cues, they do 
tell stories that are less logical, less consistent, and contain fewer 
                                                            
 44.  See Robert K. Bothwell, Social Cognition in the Courtroom: Juror Information 
Processing and Story Construction, in A HANDBOOK OF JURY RESEARCH 17-1, 17-20 (Walter 
F. Abbott & John Batt eds., 1999); Kenneth R. Weingardt, R. Jacob Leonesio & Elizabeth 
F. Loftus, Viewing Eyewitness Research from a Metacognitive Perspective, in METACOGNI-
TION: KNOWING ABOUT KNOWING 157, 164 (Janet Metcalfe & Arthur P. Shimamura eds., 
1994) (reporting that “much research on eyewitness identification has consistently found 
very weak correlations” between witness accuracy and witness confidence).  
 45.  See Blumenthal, supra note 42, at 1201-02.  
46.  Id. at 1189-91. 
 47.  See Bond, Jr. & DePaulo, supra note 39, at 225.  
 48.  See Galanter, supra note 2, at 482-84; Hadfield, supra note 2, at 730. 
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details than those of truth-tellers.”49 This claim finds some support in 
the experimental literature.50 Indeed, the field of Statement Validity 
Analysis has responded to the experimental evidence by shifting an 
investigator’s focus from demeanor cues to content-based cues, with 
judges relying on transcripts produced by an initial interview, and has 
produced higher (although far from stellar) rates of accurate lie de-
tection.51 Minzner therefore concludes that juries may be fairly accurate 
when they rely on contextual cues or well-calibrated prior probabili-
ties that a witness is lying, even if they will sometimes generate un-
reliable decisions by relying on demeanor.52 But although this reasoning 
undercuts the fear that the legal system will never be able to distin-
guish truths from lies due to the unreliability of demeanor evidence, 
it does not give a reason to prefer in-person to absent procedures. 
 Olin Wellborn is the only scholar who has directly argued that in-
person procedures are superior to absent ones despite the problem of 
demeanor evidence. In his view, the fact that “live testimony does not 
enhance credibility judgments does not imply that a trial with live 
testimony is not the best kind of trial.”53 He suggests several alterna-
tive values to live trials. For example, such proceedings may “deter 
dishonest witnesses . . . who would lie in a deposition [but who] may 
balk at lying in public, in a courtroom, in the physical presence of the 
opponent, the judge, and the jury.”54 He also notes that live testimony 
may be necessary for the perception of accurate adjudication even if it 
does not further actual accuracy—a point we shall return to later.55  
 Wellborn’s first point—that hearings may enhance accuracy even 
if they do not aid credibility determinations—deserves further devel-
opment. His argument for witness deterrence is somewhat speculative 
because we have little data on the degree to which witnesses who are 
willing to lie on an affidavit or while being deposed would refuse to 
repeat the performance in front of a judge. Some witnesses may be so 
                                                            
 49.  Max Minzner, Detecting Lies Using Demeanor, Bias, and Context, 29 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2557, 2569 (2008).  
 50.  See, e.g., Bella M. DePaulo et al., Cues to Deception, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 74, 102 
(2003) (finding that “liars were generally less forthcoming than truth tellers, . . . [that] 
their tales were less compelling” to listeners, and that they “provided fewer details than 
did truth tellers”). 
 51.  See Vrij, supra note 40, at 23 (finding, in a meta-analysis of relevant studies, an 
average accuracy rate of seventy-three percent for detecting truths and seventy-two per-
cent for detecting lies); cf. Bond, Jr. & DePaulo, supra note 39, at 229 (both experts and 
non-experts have below a fifty-five percent accuracy rate in discriminating between truths 
and lies when viewing a video sample that includes demeanor cues). 
 52.  See Minzner, supra note 49, at 2578. 
 53.  Wellborn, supra note 43, at 1092. He argues that recognition of the demeanor 
problem should lead instead to a modest reduction in the deference that appellate courts 
apply when they review trial-court fact-finding, as well as to a liberalized use of deposition 
evidence at trial, among other recommendations. Id. at 1094-99. 
 54.  Id. at 1092. 
 55. Id. 
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confident in the deposition environment that they feel little pressure 
while lying; others may find it terrifying merely to face down an ad-
versary lawyer in a conference room after having been warned that 
any deception is subject to the “penalty of perjury.”56 Moreover, this 
argument has little purchase in the many cases where deception is 
less of an obstacle to fact finding than unintentional gaps or errors in 
witness memory. Indeed, we might question whether a witness with 
a faulty memory is likely to be more persuasive in a hearing setting 
than in a deposition, due to increased preparation and rehearsal of 
testimony before the more formal proceeding.57 So if we do make gains 
in deterring deception in a live hearing or trial environment, we may 
suffer correlative losses in our ability to catch mistaken recollections. 
 But leaving deterrence of deception aside, there are other ways 
that live testimony may contribute to accuracy. Deception is most 
likely to be detected by reference to the content of a witness’s claims, 
and by comparison of that content to other evidence.58 Several fea-
tures of live examination can further this process. First, a relatively 
unprepared witness can be encouraged during cross-examination to 
commit himself to one version of a fabricated account, only to be sub-
sequently confronted by contradictory information. Such tactics, 
when employed in investigative situations, have sometimes been able 
to produce a high rate of deception detection by inducing and probing 
inconsistencies in fabricated accounts.59 There is an important caveat 
to this account, however: This “evidence confrontation” strategy re-
lies on the witness being surprised by the direction taken in the ex-
                                                            
 56.  Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c)(1) (requiring that deponents swear an oath or affirmation 
before giving testimony); 2 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FED. EVID. § 603:1 n.1 (6th 
ed. 2006) (noting that “a typical oath is ‘Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and 
nothing but the truth, so help you God?’ ” and that “[a] typical affirmation is ‘Do you affirm 
to tell the truth under penalty of perjury?’ ”). 
 57.  See Weingardt et al., supra note 44, at 183 (noting that witnesses who are exposed 
to false information after an event “consistently demonstrate overconfidence” when recall-
ing their perceptions). In the study reported, many witnesses exposed to contradictory in-
formation following an observed event expressed certainty regarding their recollections, 
even though their actual rates of accurate recollection were below chance. Id. at 177; cf. id. 
at 178 (noting that witnesses who were not exposed to inaccurate information had high 
rates of calibration between confidence and accuracy, with “certain” witnesses being correct 
approximately ninety percent of the time). As a result, those witnesses who have developed 
false recollections as a result of contamination by other sources or attorney suggestion 
during testimony preparation may exploit the “confidence equals accuracy” decisionmaking 
heuristic, and thereby seem more credible than they should. As confidence is likely to be a 
more salient characteristic in a live hearing, and as confidence is likely to increase as tes-
timony is rehearsed before such a hearing, this concern becomes especially significant in 
that setting. 
 58.  Compare Vrij, supra note 40, at 24, with Bond, Jr. & DePaulo, supra note 39, at 229. 
 59.  See Minzner, supra note 49, at 2569. Marcus points out that there may be a coun-
ter-effect that mitigates the advantages of such a strategy: Pointing to a study examining 
the effects of hostile questioning on a fact-finder’s evaluation of witness trustworthiness, he 
noted the author’s view that witnesses subjected to confrontational questioning might 
“tr[y] harder to be believable,” and succeed. Marcus, supra note 42, at 759. 
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amination. If a witness is well-prepared for the encounter and can 
anticipate the questions that the investigator is likely to ask, it is 
doubtful that the confrontation strategy will be as useful.60   
 We should therefore be wary of presuming that cross-examination 
adds significant value for deception detection when a witness has had 
an opportunity to prepare for the encounter and knows the questions 
that are likely to be asked.61 This means that the advantages of hear-
ings for detecting deception will vary by situation; questions asked of 
an unprepared witness before the two sides have exchanged signifi-
cant discovery may be very revealing. On the other hand, if a witness 
has previously been deposed and has been prepared for the encounter 
by an attorney who can easily anticipate the directions that question-
ing is likely to take, the encounter may reveal little.62 Indeed, the ear-
lier deposition transcript may be more revealing than the subsequent 
examination; the witness may have since crafted explanations of ear-
lier inconsistencies that make deceptive content harder, rather than 
easier, to detect.   
 Even when live testimony is unlikely to aid in the detection of de-
ception or error, however, it may increase the accuracy of decisions if 
it can make the existing evidence clearer.63 As Marcus has noted, 
“there is a difference between reading a treatise and being instructed 
by a live expert,”64 and as cases grow more complex that difference 
may overwhelm other accuracy considerations. Available depositions 
or affidavits may dodge important questions, or presume an under-
standing of contextual information that a judge does not in fact pos-
sess. At a hearing, a judge can interpose her own questions, pinning 
down a witness on an important point or requiring a lawyer to ex-
plain a complex transaction.65 Likewise, the additional preparation 
that may occur before a hearing may allow parties to find ways to 
                                                            
 60.  See Minzer, supra note 49, at 2569 (noting that this effect relies upon an “informa-
tional advantage” on the part of the interrogator); Chris William Sanchirico, “What Makes 
the Engine Go?”: Cognitive Limitations and Cross-Examination, 14 WIDENER L. REV. 507, 
516 (2009) (noting that “[c]onstructing testimony on the fly is considerably more difficult” 
than preparing for questions in advance, and that unanticipated questions are the hardest 
for insincere witnesses to answer without giving away the deception); Marcus, supra note 
42, at 759; see also DePaulo et al., supra note 50, at 103 (noting that planned presentations 
of deceptive testimony are generally harder to detect).  
 61.  See Sanchirico, supra note 60, at 521 (urging that it is “crucial” that cross-
examination questions be unanticipated if we desire to place insincere witnesses in a situa-
tion where they are likely to slip up). 
 62.  See id.; ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL 65 & n.83 (1999) (noting that a 
witness’s ability to resist the impulse to be led by a cross-examining attorney into what 
appear to be self-serving contradictory statements is a central means by which the witness 
can appear credible, and that witness preparation is a key means of ensuring that this 
consistency is produced). 
 63.  See Marcus, supra note 42, at 763. 
 64.  Id.  
 65.  See FED. R. EVID. 614 (permitting a court to conduct its own examination of wit-
nesses sua sponte, whether those witnesses were called by a party or by the court itself).  
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communicate complex information in more digestible ways.66 Of 
course, paper has clarity benefits as well: It may be easier to remem-
ber technical information when it is read than when it is heard,67 in 
part because a reader can interact with written information in ways 
that facilitate recall.68 But such advantages are mitigated in the pre-
sent analysis, which focuses on judicial decisionmaking, given that 
judges can order transcripts of hearings and even request supple-
mental briefing when necessary, allowing them to have the best of 
both worlds. So, at least for judges, live hearings and trials have ac-
curacy benefits that are unrelated to deception or witness error: They 
allow the clarification of a confusing record through interaction be-
tween judges, witnesses, and advocates, and they allow advocates to 
present complicated information in ways that may be more intuitive 
and understandable for generalist judges.69     
D.   The Biasing Effects of Witness Appearance 
 Finally, however, there is one more cost we must weigh in the ac-
curacy balance: In addition to distorting fact-finding through the in-
troduction of unreliable demeanor evidence, hearings may impede 
accurate fact-finding by introducing biases for or against particular 
witnesses. Two forms of bias are particularly worrisome in this con-
text. The first is the innate human tendency to associate one type of 
positive trait with other positive traits that a person might possess, 
and to do likewise with negative traits. The second is the human im-
pulse to view members of our social in-groups favorably while seeing 
members of out-groups in a darker light. Both of these forms of bias 
may distort fact-finding by making a fact-finder trust or distrust wit-
nesses for irrelevant reasons, and both may be exacerbated by meet-
ing the witness in a live hearing environment. 
                                                            
 66.  See FEDERAL PRACTICE MANUAL FOR LEGAL AID ATTORNEYS 148 (Jeffrey S. Gut-
man, ed., 2004) (suggesting that oral arguments may be particularly useful when a case 
“hinges on complicated concepts”).  
 67.  See Marcus, supra note 42, at 764. 
 68.  Oldfather explains the clarity virtues of text by focusing on the process he 
calls “backlooping”: 
For an appellate judge viewing a transcript, the words on the page do not ap-
pear for only an instant, but instead remain to be reread and reconsidered. This 
ability to “backloop” allows the reader to devote less effort to keeping informa-
tion in memory and thus to allocate more cognitive resources to understanding 
the material. The limitations of oral memory no longer constrain the intellec-
tual operations that may be performed with the information conveyed.  
Chad M. Oldfather, Appellate Courts, Historical Facts, and the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 
57 VAND. L. REV. 437, 455 (2004). 
 69.  See STEVEN LUBET, MODERN TRIAL ADVOCACY 279-80 (3d ed. 2010) (describing the 
ways that advocates can employ devices such as models, maps, diagrams, graphs, and 
charts to clarify spatial relationships, complicated timelines, or financial information).  
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 The first form of bias—often referred to as the “halo effect[]”—
invokes our “tendency to assume that like goes with like” so that 
“[s]alient information (such as height or attractiveness) activates pos-
itive or negative associations that color how people process every-
thing else they learn about an individual.”70 Early impressions of a 
person can induce us to like or dislike an individual, and those men-
tal attitudes tend to impact our subsequent evaluations of that per-
son. In one early study, a researcher provided study participants 
with a list of characteristics possessed by a hypothetical individual.71 
Each participant read a list containing the same overall mix of traits, 
but some lists described the favorable characteristics before the nega-
tive ones, while other lists fronted the bad news.72 Simply varying the 
order in which people read these traits generated a “considerable dif-
ference” in the participants’ descriptions of the hypothetical person: 
starting with positive traits resulted in an impression of a “predomi-
nantly . . . able person who possesses certain shortcomings which do 
not, however, overshadow his merits,” while reversing the order led 
to the person being perceived “as a ‘problem,’ whose abilities are 
hampered by his serious difficulties.”73 So the mere fact that certain 
information is learned before other information can radically affect 
the final picture we will arrive at even when the differently ordered 
information is identical. 
 One way to account for this tendency is as an example of confir-
mation bias, our tendency to “seek information that . . . support[s] 
[our] . . . existing beliefs and to interpret information in ways that 
are partial to those . . . beliefs.”74 Especially when looking at ambiguous 
evidence, we are likely to draw inferences in favor of the view we 
currently think is most likely. This “primacy effect” leads us to “form 
an opinion early in the process and then evaluate subsequently ac-
quired information in a way that is partial to that opinion.”75 To 
the extent that our initial impressions rest on a shaky foundation—
such as the mental tendency to relate positively valued surface 
characteristics, such as beauty or social status, with valuable under-
lying characteristics, like intelligence or honesty—we may skew our 
                                                            
 70.  Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore 
Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 
1251, 1266-67 (2005). 
71.  Id. at 1266. 
 72.    Id. 
 73.  S. E. Asch, Forming Impressions of Personality, 41 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 258, 270 (1948).  
 74.  Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many 
Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 177 (1998); see also Shelly Chaiken & Durairaj Mahes-
waran, Heuristic Processing Can Bias Systematic Processing: Effects of Source Credibility, 
Argument Ambiguity, and Task Importance on Attitude Judgment, 66 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 460, 469 (1994) (see discussion infra note 76).  
 75.  Nickerson, supra note 74, at 187. 
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resulting judgments of witness credibility or party culpability based 
on irrelevancies.76  
 A number of characteristics revealed during viva voce hearings 
and trials might activate the primacy effect in a way that would cast 
doubt on the accuracy of fact-finding. Perhaps the most studied form 
of the halo effect is the physical appearance bias. In study after 
study, people who form impressions of others based on photos pre-
sume that physically attractive people possess other desirable qualities 
as well. We unconsciously link traits such as kindness, intelligence, 
and honesty with beauty.77 This leads to a skew in fact-finding, doc-
umented in many contexts. For instance, “[u]nattractive litigants re-
ceive higher sentences and lower damage awards in simulated legal 
proceedings, while attractive litigants have an advantage.”78 
 Physical attractiveness is unlikely to be the only source of bias 
introduced by hearings, however. Other socially valued attributes 
may create a similar halo effect and induce a fact-finder to credit one 
                                                            
 76.  Another way to characterize the conflict between initial impressions and fair eval-
uations of witness credibility may be drawn from persuasion theory. In one model of social-
informational processing, known as the “Heuristic-Systematic Model,” people have two 
overlapping cognitive systems that can be employed in order to evaluate the credibility of a 
message. “Systematic processing” involves a “comprehensive analytic” attempt to “evaluate 
the validity of the advocated position by scrutinizing the persuasive information and relat-
ing this information to their previous knowledge of the persuasion issue.” Alexander To-
dorov, Shelly Chaiken & Marlone D. Henderson, The Heuristic-Systematic Model of Social 
Information Processing, in THE PERSUASION HANDBOOK: DEVELOPMENTS IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 195, 197 (James Price Dillard & Michael Pfau eds., 2002). When people engage 
in “[h]euristic processing,” by contrast, they take a less analytic approach, focusing on eas-
ily accessible information that “enables them to use simple decision rules or heuristics” to 
decide whether to trust a message. Id. Either cognitive system may be invoked in a par-
ticular situation, depending on the context in which a person hears a message. Two such 
contextual factors are most relevant here: To the degree that a message is ambiguous (that 
is, it neither clearly supports nor clearly contradicts a conclusion) and to the degree that a 
source is initially perceived as credible, a person evaluating that message becomes more 
likely to rely on heuristic processing. See Chaiken & Maheswaran, supra note 74, at 469. 
As a result, the initial credibility judgment is more likely to control the final view of mes-
sage validity (due to a “trustworthy source = trustworthy message” heuristic), in part due 
to a partial substitution of heuristic reasoning for a systematic evaluation of message con-
tent, and in part due to a biasing effect of the initial heuristic judgment on the systematic 
reasoning process itself. Id. Applied to the context of hearing-based decisionmaking, this 
suggests that a decisionmaker who receives a favorable initial impression of a witness’s 
credibility due to surface features may subsequently give lowered scrutiny to the coherence 
of the witness’s message and may be biased towards a pro-credibility finding to the extent 
that the content is actually analyzed.  
 77.  SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL: 
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 100 (1988); Marc-André Reinhard & Siegfried L. Sporer, 
Content Versus Source Cue Information as a Basis for Credibility Judgments: The Impact of 
Task Involvement 41 SOC. PSYCHOL. 93, 95-97 (2010) (demonstrating experimentally that 
test subjects find more attractive speakers to be more credible). 
 78.  Deborah L. Rhode, The Injustice of Appearance, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1038 
(2009). Cf. Marc W. Patry, Attractive but Guilty: Deliberation and the Physical Attractive-
ness Bias, 102 PSYCHOL. REP. 727, 728 (2008) (noting the general effect, but adding the 
caveat that defendants who “used their attractiveness in the execution of a crime” may be 
punished more harshly than otherwise-similar, less-attractive defendants). 
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witness more than another. Indicators of high social status, including 
a witness’s race, gender, clothing, level of grooming, occupation, and 
style of speech, all increase the likelihood that a fact-finder will view 
a witness as credible.79 Although it may be hard to totally conceal so-
cial status from a fact-finder—we can expect a judge to learn such 
information from the sound of a witness’s voice or even from the in-
formation that can be gleaned from a written record80—we still may 
be concerned that the primacy effect will amplify the power of such 
information in particular settings. Social status may be gleaned from 
a written record, but it is unlikely to be the first thing a judge will 
encounter. In a hearing, such information may be conveyed long be-
fore a witness takes the stand. So, while realizing that we can never 
avoid halo effects entirely, we should nevertheless number them as 
among the factors that could make hearing-based fact-finding less 
accurate than a paper-based process. 
 The other form of bias that might concern us is the tendency to 
favor in-groups over out-groups. “In intergroup contexts people gen-
erally behave so as to gain or maintain an advantage for their own 
group over other groups in terms of resources, status, prestige, and so 
forth.”81 Over time, we develop schema for particular groups, which 
color our subsequent interactions with those groups. The ways such 
schema may influence fact-finding is as varied as a list of the factors 
that constitute our personal identities. 
 Factors such as race provide noteworthy examples of problematic 
in-group bias. In testing designed to probe unconscious associations 
between a defendant’s race and his innocence, participants “held im-
plicit associations between Black and Guilty,” and those associations 
“predicted judgments of ambiguous evidence as more indicative of 
guilt.”82 Note that although this effect might be explained to some 
extent by the halo effect—whiteness may be a marker of high status 
that induces positive associations for white and black people alike—
the use of implicit association tests shows a more mixed picture, in 
which Caucasians generally associate whiteness with positive char-
                                                            
 79.  J. Alexander Tanford & Sarah Tanford, Better Trials Through Science: A Defense 
of Psychologist-Lawyer Collaboration, 66 N.C. L. REV. 741, 750 (1988); HANS & VIDMAR, 
supra note 43, at 140 (noting that “we evaluate a person’s credibility by his or her speech 
style” and that styles of speaking are often associated with the sex, social class, or ethnic 
background of the speaker); WILLIAM M. O’BARR, LINGUISTIC EVIDENCE: LANGUAGE, POW-
ER, AND STRATEGY IN THE COURTROOM 74 (1982) (finding that mock jurors found the same 
testimony more convincing if it was delivered using a “powerful” mode of speaking than if a 
“powerless” mode was employed).   
 80.  Andrew E. Taslitz, Confessing in the Human Voice: A Defense of the Privilege 
Against Self-Incrimination, 7 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL'Y & ETHICS J. 121, 174, 177, 183-84 (2008). 
 81.  Michael A. Hogg, Intergroup Relations, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 479, 
480 (John Delamater ed., 2006). 
 82.  Justin D. Levinson et al., Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias: The Guilty/Not Guilty 
Implicit Association Test, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187, 189-90, 206 (2010). 
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acteristics (because the halo effect and the in-group effect reinforce 
each other), while black people have more mixed results, with some 
individuals associating blackness with badness and others reversing 
the association.83   
 Similar effects might be expected for other traits. Female judges, 
for instance, are more likely than male judges to rule in favor of (pre-
dominantly female) sex discrimination litigants.84 Likewise, we might 
worry that fact-finders will favor those who hold similar social or po-
litical views,85 and that a fact-finder might draw inferences about a 
witness’s beliefs based on how that witness dresses and behaves.  
 It is important to qualify the significance of these sources of bias. 
Judges may be able to suppress innate impulses towards stereotyp-
ing in decisionmaking to varying degrees, at least some of the time.86 
We should be wary of placing complete trust in judicial self-control, 
however. Judges are as human as the rest of us, and there is evi-
dence suggesting that they will rely unconsciously on inadmissible 
information when it is a salient element of a case.87 This is not to say 
every decision will be the product of a halo effect or in-group bias; 
oftentimes the evidence may be one-sided enough that these effects 
cannot exert a significant influence,88 and in other cases, varying 
forms of bias may cancel each other out. But to the extent that avoid-
ing a hearing lowers the salience of various markers of a party's or a 
witness’s identity, such avoidance might also lower the risk that a 
judge’s evaluation of evidence will be skewed by these forms of bias. 
 One type of situation might require a different analysis than that 
offered above. When a judge is already strongly biased against a dis-
putant, it is possible that being visually confronted by that person 
might act as a counterweight, inducing empathy that could serve to 
mitigate that bias. As an example, imagine that a judge was faced 
with deciding whether a man who had repeatedly committed violent 
sexual crimes was so dangerous that he should be placed in preven-
tive incarceration even after he has served the entirety of the sen-
                                                            
 83.  See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 
84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1199-1200 (2009); see also HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 43, at 
137-38 (noting that in close cases, race can be a factor in decisionmaking, but that the di-
rection of the effect may vary depending on whether the jury members are of the same or of 
a different race than the defendant). 
 84.  See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and 
Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 768-69 (2007). In-group bias is only one 
possible explanation for this data, of course. It is also possible that differing life experi-
ences influence men and women to form different estimates of base rates of sexual dis-
crimination and harassment. 
 85. See Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and 
Why, in Acquaintance-Rape Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 793, 800-01, 804-05 (2010). 
 86.  Rachlinski et al., supra note 83, at 1202-04, 1221-26.  
 87.  See Wistrich et al., supra note 70, at 1330-31. 
 88.  See BURNS, supra note 4, at 9 (arguing that “it is the evidence in the case, more 
than any other factor, that determines the outcome” of most jury trials). 
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tences due to his prior crimes.89 Perhaps, a judge might reason, view-
ing the potential detainee can only help. After all, the presence of 
this person in the flesh might mitigate the bias produced merely by 
knowing his record.90   
 There is an important kernel of truth in this suggestion. In some 
cases, a judge may be able to move past initially unjust impressions 
of a defendant in part due to the emotional impact of seeing and 
hearing the other person in a live encounter.91 But this approach 
should be viewed with appropriate caution, at least in cases where 
the judge already has a strongly negative view of a party or witness. 
First, because of the initially negative impression, a judge might well 
end up evaluating ambiguous demeanor cues as more “confirmation” 
that the witness should not be trusted; as in the Asch experiment, 
first impressions may dominate over subsequent information.92 What 
is more, in seeking to move from one strong emotion (antipathy) to a 
place of neutrality, by harnessing a countervailing emotion (empa-
thy), we create a real risk. Experiencing empathy towards someone 
we have previously disliked is often an unpleasant feeling, and the 
cognitive dissonance involved in holding two such opposing states in 
the mind is unpleasant, so that people experiencing such states “are 
motivated to reduce [the conflict].”93 The urge to return to a non-
conflicted mental state may produce some benefits—such as greater 
attention to conflicting evidence—but it may also encourage rash or 
impulsive decisions.94 As a result, the ambivalent attitudes may “be-
come polarized, resulting in exaggerated positive attitudes if exposed 
to positive information about the person, and exaggerated negative 
                                                            
 89.  See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 354 (1997) (considering due process 
issues in connection with the indefinite detention, under the Kansas Sexually Violent 
Predator Act, of a person who had engaged in a “chilling history of repeated child sexual 
molestation and abuse”). 
 90.  See Kenworthey Bilz, We Don’t Want to Hear It: Psychology, Literature and the 
Narrative Model of Judging, 2010 ILL. L. REV. 429, 465-66 (noting that “inducing empathy 
. . . predictably inspires an emotional response of sympathy and compassion” and can lead 
to a “softening of attitudes toward the wrongdoer”); id. at 467-68 (noting that feelings of 
empathy can help reduce “ ‘correspondence bias,’ in which we assume that others’ behav-
iors are a product of immutable personality traits rather than of their circumstances”). 
 91.  See id. at 465-66; Laurie L. Levenson, Courtroom Demeanor: The Theater of the 
Courtroom, 92 MINN. L. REV. 573, 592-94 (2008) (describing high-profile cases in which the 
mild or contrite appearance of the defendants may have garnered the sympathy of jurors); 
BURNS, supra note 62, at 134-35 (noting that the “aural medium” has a socializing influ-
ence, making it harder for a jury to treat the case “simply as a stereotype of a certain kind 
of controversy”).  
 92.  See Asch, supra note 73, at 270-72; Levenson, supra note 91, at 594-96 (relating 
how, in the trial of Timothy McVeigh, the jury interpreted his “bland[]” clothing and stoic 
demeanor as evidence that McVeigh was a “cold, heartless, and calculating killer” who felt 
no remorse). 
 93.  See Bilz, supra note 90 at 464 & n.165 (collecting psychological sources on the 
motivating effects of cognitive dissonance). 
 94.  See id. at 464-65. 
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attitudes when exposed to negative information”—a process that can 
also lead to extreme actions toward the subject of the ambivalence.95 
Many might regard this possible “solution” to the problem of initial 
bias to be worse than the problem it addresses. Given the conflicting 
possible results that can arise from the use of demeanor as a debias-
ing tool, one thing seems clear: The visual and aural presence of dis-
putants and witnesses creates a significant risk of bias based on ap-
pearance, social status, and in-group affiliation, and the danger of 
these factors is not obviously outweighed by any bias-correcting func-
tion when a fact-finder has an initially negative impression of a par-
ticular party to the dispute.96  
 As we have seen, the conventional judicial wisdom fails to provide 
a fruitful foundation for a theory of live procedures because it is 
premised on a faulty intuition. Neither people in general, nor judges 
in particular, are good at catching deception or inaccuracies of mem-
ory from demeanor cues, and in fact such cues are more likely to lead 
a fact-finder astray than to aid her. Some scholarly critiques have 
pointed out this concern, but they have failed to supplement it with a 
holistic consideration of the accuracy costs and benefits of live proce-
dures as opposed to a decision on a written record.  
 Now that we have surveyed some of the concerns at stake in such 
a decision, we have seen the following things: 
 First, live testimony will rarely add value in detecting deception. 
When it does help, it will not usually be through useful demeanor 
cues. Rather, a witness’s deception may be unearthed through sur-
prises at cross-examination that reveal inconsistencies in the wit-
ness’s story. Such surprises are most likely to occur when a witness 
has not been well-prepared for the cross-examination. Successful 
cross-examination is therefore most likely to occur when a party’s 
opportunity to woodshed a witness is limited by either lack of infor-
mation or financial resources. Once the witness is well-prepared to 
testify, however, the primary effect of a hearing on a credibility de-
termination will be to add misleading demeanor evidence into con-
sideration, which will tend to lower the quality of credibility findings. 
 Second, live testimony may nevertheless increase the accuracy of 
decisionmaking by clarifying vague or ambiguous evidence. A judge 
may find deposition transcripts and affidavits opaque on the points 
                                                            
 95.  Id. 
 96.  To be clear, I do not wish to suggest that activating empathy in general provides 
no value in the fair resolution of cases. Rather, I am urging only that empathy is unlikely 
to help correct an initially negative bias against a party in a way that returns a decision-
maker to a more neutral state of mind. Cf. Jody Lyneé Madeira, Lashing Reason to the 
Mast: Understanding Judicial Constraints on Emotion in Personal Injury Litigation, 40 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 137, 142 (2006) (describing the personal injury trial as a forum in which 
“[p]ainful sights and sounds” provide “a forum for negotiation between narratives” as par-
ties vie for the empathy of jurors). 
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where she needs clarity in order to reach a decision, and the opportu-
nity to ask follow-up questions of a witness at a hearing may be a 
useful way to resolve these questions. Likewise, in very complex cas-
es, a live hearing may provide a party with an opportunity to explain 
complex scientific or economic evidence to a greater extent than a 
paper briefing would allow. 
 Third, the presence of a witness in court may induce or worsen 
certain forms of decisional bias. Specifically, live procedures may em-
phasize cues as to the attractiveness, race, and social status of a witness 
that will encourage a fact-finder to affiliate with some witnesses and 
distrust others on the basis of factors that bear little relation to accuracy. 
Thus, to the degree that a judge has not already had the opportunity 
to form a personal impression of the parties or witnesses, a decision 
on a written record may be shielded from certain forms of bias. 
 So, in short, the benefits of live testimony are most likely to accrue 
when the witnesses are not prepared for cross-examination or when 
the evidentiary record is either vague or technically complex. Live 
procedures will have significant accuracy costs, however, when the 
dispute centers on the credibility of well-prepared witnesses or when 
a live hearing or trial will allow a judge to form first impressions of 
witnesses based on their appearances. 
IV.   SUBJECTIVE FAIRNESS:  MAKING PAPER-FOCUSED  
LITIGATION PALATABLE 
 Although the accuracy concerns described above are central to any 
consideration of the utility of live hearings and trials, they do not tell 
the whole story. A theory that attends heavily to how accurate legal 
decisions are, but pays no attention to how acceptable those proce-
dures are to the litigants and the public, ignores the fact that the law 
requires public acceptance and cooperation if it is to meaningfully 
guide the conduct of the citizens it governs.97 A useful label for these 
concerns is “subjective fairness.” Unlike the accuracy concerns de-
scribed above, which relate to the ability of judicial decisions to accu-
rately describe historical events98 and can therefore be said to involve 
a fairness that is separate from the preferences of either party, sub-
jective fairness focuses on “whether disputants and neutral observers 
believe that procedures and outcomes are fair, rather than whether 
the procedures or outcomes were fair in some objective sense.”99 
                                                            
 97.  See Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Accept-
ability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1359 (1985). 
 98.  Cf. GOLDMAN, supra note 25, at 59-68 (defending the notion that a statement is 
true if it successfully describes events in the world). 
 99.  E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUS-
TICE 26 (1988). 
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 As we shall see, the decision to resolve legal disputes without a live 
hearing may come at a cost from the standpoint of subjective fairness, 
even if (as discussed above) dispensing with hearings would make the 
resulting outcomes more accurate. Subjective fairness, in other 
words, does not always correspond with objective fairness. Neverthe-
less, in those cases where there are significant accuracy gains avail-
able from using a paper trial decision procedure, the subjective fairness 
costs of such a procedure often can be minimized to the point where they 
will be outweighed by the procedure’s objective accuracy advantages. 
 At the outset, there is a potential objection to this line of inquiry 
that is worth addressing. One type of reader, when informed that 
procedures may involve a trade-off between objective accuracy and 
subjective experiences of fairness, may feel that there is no trade-off 
at all. After all, such a reader would say, the goal of legal procedures 
is to “get it right,” and we should not sacrifice that goal in the pursuit 
of making litigants “feel” better.100 Indeed, it might even seem to rep-
resent a form of disrespect to give litigants a “dumbed down” form of 
justice that feels satisfying, but is in fact less reliable. In this fram-
ing, procedures that have high ratings of subjective fairness but low-
er levels of objective accuracy are like junk food: a satisfying experi-
ence, but nonetheless bad for the people who enjoy it.  
 There are several reasons why this objection is less weighty than 
it might seem. One response is to fall back on democratic assump-
tions; if people, by and large, prefer certain types of legal procedures, 
perhaps that provides enough of a reason to make such procedures 
accessible.101 Under such a theory, taking the preferences of the pub-
lic into account when designing litigation procedures can be justified 
on the grounds that to do otherwise would be paternalistic. Just as 
we allow people to eat candy bars even if they may suffer bad conse-
quences from doing so, we should not presume to choose in their 
stead that they should prefer one type of litigation procedure over 
another.102 Unfortunately, this response can only take us so far. Al-
though it might seem relevant when people have the choice between 
a number of different procedures for dispute resolution—as in, for 
example, the arbitration context—the legal system acts both as a “de-
fault rule” for situations where no private choices have been made 
                                                            
 100.  See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 
61 OKLA. L. REV. 319, 338 (2008) (expressing skepticism that the demands of participatory 
rights can ever rise above the needs of adjudicative accuracy). 
 101.  Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social Science Perspective 
on Civil Procedure Reform, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 871, 871-72 (1997); Austin Sarat, Studying 
American Legal Culture: An Assessment of Survey Evidence, 11 L. & SOC’Y REV. 427, 430 (1977). 
 102.  See Tyler, supra note 101, at 871-72. 
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and as a backstop when those other options have broken down.103 To 
continue the analogy, it is one thing to say that people should be free 
to buy candy bars if they want them, but another to make candy bars 
the only option provided to poor children who depend on school lunch 
programs. The first option respects private choice, while the second 
imposes what may be an unhealthy choice on a population of people 
who are ill-suited to judge between different options for themselves 
and who may be unable to select another option in any event.104   
 In the end, the value of respecting individual preferences for par-
ticular types of procedures might be overcome if we had reason to 
think that those preferences placed individuals in danger of signifi-
cant harm. As one author has noted, the powerful effects of perceived 
procedural fairness can put “[s]cience . . . at the service of authority,” 
helping to “mobiliz[e] consent” to official action.105 The danger then 
arises that authorities will abuse this information to “construct[] pro-
cedures that give people the opportunity to be heard while, at the 
same time, systematically denying them just outcomes.”106 In the pro-
cedural justice literature, this concern is often described as the prob-
lem of “false consciousness”: “If people are satisfied with objectively 
poor outcomes because they believe they were generated by a fair 
process, this may reflect a false consciousness that is not desirable.”107 
In a condition of false consciousness, citizens may be satisfied 
                                                            
 103.  See Solum, supra note 25, at 261 (noting that litigants are often unable to freely 
choose the procedures that will apply to their cases and may indeed be forced to play ac-
cording to a particular set of rules or suffer a default judgment).  
 104.  The candy analogy can, of course, be taken too far. It might justly be said that to 
compare the preference of citizens for procedures that allow them to voice their grievances 
to a preference for junk food is to minimize very real expressive and moral values that are 
at stake in such a setting. This concern becomes especially compelling when we recall that 
the public generally places relatively little confidence in legal authorities, including courts, 
which suggests that legal institutions may be failing to provide the public with the type of 
justice it desires. See Tyler, supra note 101, at 872. Moreover, it may be inappropriate (de-
pending on one’s ethical assumptions) to describe the desire to participate in legal proceed-
ings and to be treated with dignity by public officials as a “mere” preference, like the desire 
for sugary foods. Some commentators insist vigorously that procedural preferences of this 
type have deep moral foundations. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Jus-
tice, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW 65, 67 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamil-
ton eds., 2001) (“People’s attitudes are . . . important in their own right, because a central 
tenet of democratic government is that . . . people should be able to accept the solutions 
reached by those in power.”); JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
STATE 45-49, 162-63 (1985) (tracing the source of our constitutional right to be heard by a 
decisionmaker to our moral right, as autonomous beings, to be treated as ends rather than 
as a means to someone else’s ends, and urging that connecting procedural rights to such 
dignitary values has an “intuitive plausibility”). 
 105.  Austin Sarat, Authority, Anxiety, and Procedural Justice: Moving from Scientific 
Detachment to Critical Engagement, 27 L. & SOC’Y REV. 647, 656 (1993) (book review). 
 106.  Id. at 658-59. 
 107.  TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 111 (2006). 
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when they should not be, relying on a system’s perceived neutrality 
but ignoring its tendency to produce unfair outcomes.108 
 Despite this concern, the harm resulting from employing objec-
tively accurate procedures that feel substantially unfair may some-
times be great enough to justify sacrificing small amounts of accuracy 
for large gains in public acceptance. To see why, we must look at the 
system from a large-scale perspective and consider the role of indi-
vidual case outcomes in accounting for compliance with legal rules.109 
From this perspective, individual civil cases send a “behavioral mes-
sage” through which society attempts to “influence individuals’ con-
duct” by “forg[ing] a link between . . . wrong and liability.”110 
 When we focus on deterrence, the role of subjective assessments of 
fairness takes on a great deal of importance. In a classic study, Tyler 
surveyed a large number of Chicago residents both before and after 
their encounters with law enforcement and the courts. In analyzing 
the responses to his surveys, he found that those citizens who viewed 
legal procedures as fair were more likely to have a positive view of 
legal authorities and the legitimacy of the legal system.111 Having a 
favorable view of legal authorities and the legitimacy of the judicial 
system, in turn, made the individuals more likely to comply with the 
commands of the law.112 One implication of this finding is that even if 
legal procedures are very accurate, the willingness of people to obey 
the law may decline if those people view those procedures as un-
fair.113 The significance of this effect is not overwhelming—many oth-
er factors bear on legal compliance, so a modest increase in subjective 
dissatisfaction will not immediately lead to a strong upswell in law-
breaking114—but it is still a factor that should be considered before 
                                                            
 108.  Sarat, supra note 105, at 659, 662; TYLER, supra note 107, at 147; see also Robert 
J. MacCoun, Voice, Control and Belonging: The Double-Edged Sword of Procedural Fair-
ness, 1 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 171, 193 (2005). 
 109.  See Tyler & Lind, supra note 104, at 66 (“[F]or the law to be effective, people must 
obey it.”). 
 110.  Nesson, supra note 97, at 1359. 
 111.  See TYLER, supra note 107, at 63; Tyler & Lind, supra note 104, at 80.  
 112.  TYLER, supra note 107, at 62-64. The effect on legal compliance can take several 
different forms. First, dissatisfied litigants may be less likely to obey specific judicial or-
ders, such as the obligation to follow probation conditions, satisfy a judgment debt, or pay 
child support. To the extent that litigants experience procedures as unfair, compliance with 
such orders is likely to decrease. See Tyler, supra note 101, at 872-74. This problem be-
comes particularly worrisome when we confront the reality that sanctions alone are often 
insufficient to compel compliance with judicial orders. See id. at 873. Second, a negative 
view of the legal system’s legitimacy may lead as well to a lowered willingness to comply 
with the law when it clashes with individual preferences or moral beliefs; in other words, 
lowered views of systemic legitimacy may undermine the law’s ability to produce general 
deterrence of illegal activity. See id. at 873-74. 
 113.  See Tyler & Lind, supra note 104, at 80.  
 114.  See id. at 80-81; TYLER, supra note 107, at 59-60 (finding, in a regression analysis 
of survey data from numerous Chicago residents, that compliance with the law correlated 
most strongly with views that the law’s commands were morally just, that the legitimacy of 
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we decide to ignore public reactions to changes in judicial procedures 
solely on the ground that the new procedures are more accurate. In 
the end, it seems inappropriate to ignore either concept of fairness. 
Increasing subjective satisfaction through procedural changes that 
cause large decreases in accuracy would seem subject to the false 
consciousness objection, but modest increases in accuracy that come 
at the cost of large decreases in perceptions of fairness may harm the 
cause of deterrence more than they help it. 
 This brings us to the central question of this section: Will indi-
viduals respond more favorably to procedures that employ live testi-
mony than those who rely only on briefing and record evidence? If so, 
decisionmakers who must decide between the two procedures might 
sometimes be faced with a hard choice, at least in cases where pres-
ence is a hindrance to good fact-finding rather than an aid. They 
might choose to dispense with live testimony, gaining more accuracy 
in fact-finding at the cost of making the litigants unhappy and possi-
bly worsening their view of the legitimacy of law. Or alternatively, 
they might hold a hearing or live trial in order to keep the litigants 
happy and thereby lose some measure of confidence in the accuracy 
of the final result.  
 This is not an idle concern. Although this precise question has not 
been studied, people who respond to surveys regarding their views of 
what make procedures fair often express preferences that would ill-
accord with a widespread adoption of hearing-less decision proce-
dures.115 One such preference—a litigant’s desire to control the man-
ner in which her case is made to a court—deserves sustained atten-
tion in this context.116  
 It is fairly clear that litigants value what has been called “process 
control”—meaning “control over the opportunity to state one’s case” 
to a decisionmaker.117 People value process control for a number of 
                                                                                                                                           
legal authorities played a modest but measurable role in compliance, and that deterrence 
and peer opinion played a smaller but still significant role). 
 115.  See generally TYLER, supra note 107, at 137-38. 
 116.  Other factors that are often enumerated are the degree to which people perceive 
decisionmakers to be “unbiased, honest, and principled,” the degree to which decisionmak-
ers seem “benevolent and caring,” and the degree to which decisionmakers treat disputants 
with “dignity and respect.” Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 
GA. L. REV. 407, 421 (2008) (adding these three factors to the case-control and expressive 
concerns described above). It seems doubtful that the decision to employ a paper trial 
would significantly affect the neutrality interest in having an unbiased decisionmaker, 
given that it treats all parties in a similar manner. Likewise, to the extent that the reasons 
for employing a non-hearing procedure are explained to litigants and the court and then 
explains the reasons for its decision in a way that shows that it has considered the parties’ 
arguments, it is unlikely that the interests in having a decisionmaker seem to care about 
your rights or respect your dignity will be greatly affected. See id. at 429 (“Perceived trust-
worthiness is enhanced when the authorities demonstrate that they have actually consid-
ered the information offered during voice opportunities.”).  
 117.  TYLER, supra note 107, at 115. 
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reasons. Some of its value is as a means to an end; parties want to 
control the evidence and arguments presented to a court so that they 
can make sure that a persuasive case is made and thereby maximize 
their chances of winning.118 The decision to hold live hearings or not 
should have little impact on this value in most cases because the at-
torney, regardless of the extent to which the client values process 
control, is ethically obliged to consult with his client regarding the 
means by which the client’s litigation objectives are to be pursued.119 
There may, no doubt, be situations in which the client’s control over 
the strategic or tactical litigation choices will be impaired in the ab-
sence of live proceedings. If a client lacks the means to monitor his 
attorney’s conduct by perusing the lawyer’s written submissions—
perhaps due to a lack of legal sophistication—the observation of the 
lawyer’s performance at a live hearing might be the best available in-
dicator of the quality of the lawyer’s efforts on his behalf. There may, 
indeed, be cases where this value becomes paramount, due to the 
combination of a particularly unsophisticated client and a lawyer 
whose poor performance calls out for client monitoring. But unless 
the hearing in question would occur early in a case, it may be too late 
for the process to add much value in terms of the client’s ability to 
control the content of the case presented by his lawyers. So overall, 
this instrumental value of process control will not be greatly affected 
by the decision to hear live testimony at the trial stage. 
 The instrumental value of process control does not tell the whole 
story, however; litigants derive significant value from expressing 
themselves to a decisionmaker even in the absence of a clear connec-
tion between such expression and a plausible change in the case’s 
outcome.120 Although this fact might seem surprising, it has been 
documented in a number of studies that giving litigants opportunities 
to control the presentation of their case matters even when the deci-
sionmaker openly gives very little weight to the litigants’ argu-
ments.121 Indeed, this effect can persist even when the decisionmaker 
announces that the litigants’ views will have no effect on the deci-
sion. In one experiment, conducted by Lind, a task-assigner “an-
nounced his decision” regarding the workload of participants, making 
it clear that the decision “was final and not subject to change,” and 
                                                            
 118.  See John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CAL. L. REV. 541, 
550-52, 556 (1978) (urging that, because procedural control gives parties the ability to in-
troduce “possibly important contextual factors” that a neutral investigator would overlook, 
it will maximize the chances that the result will be an “attainment of distributive justice” 
between the parties). 
 119.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2003). 
 120.  See TYLER, supra note 107, at 116. 
 121.  See, e.g., id. at 133; MacCoun, supra note 108, at 192 (describing the study re-
ported in E. Allan Lind et al., Voice, Control, and Procedural Justice: Instrumental and 
Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments, 59 J. Pers. & Soc. Psych. 952 (1990)). 
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then invited some of them to offer comments anyway.122 The partici-
pants who were permitted to offer comments rated the procedures as 
significantly fairer than did those participants who were not provided 
with such an opportunity.123   
 This non-instrumental process control value—what we might call 
the value of self-expression in procedure—seems more likely to be 
infringed by paper-based procedures. The risk is that judges who de-
cide cases without holding evidentiary hearings may seem like bu-
reaucratic black boxes because the process of considering and weigh-
ing evidence is hidden from the parties. Parties may therefore feel as 
if they have not been able to express their point of view to the judge, 
which in turn will lead to a decline in assessments of procedural fair-
ness. What is worse, this problem may be magnified in the very cases 
in which hearings are most likely to be objectively unfair. As dis-
cussed above,124 hearings pose a particular risk to the accuracy of 
judgments when the dispute centers around the credibility of the dis-
putants, due to the misleading effects of demeanor evidence and the 
biasing effects of party appearance and behavior. But, at least on an 
intuitive level, it is in these cases—cases in which the decision must 
necessarily discredit the honesty or accuracy of one party’s story—
that the denial of an opportunity to address the decisionmaker is 
most likely to feel fundamentally unfair to the parties. And this prob-
lem may be exacerbated by the fact that the flaws that a non-hearing 
procedure is attempting to avoid—that is, our cognitive limits in as-
sessing the likelihood of deception when demeanor is in play—cut 
against the grain of our everyday intuition that we can tell when 
someone is lying to us.125 
 For several reasons, however, the disadvantages of paper proce-
dures for litigants’ perceptions of subjective fairness are less serious 
than they might initially seem. First, it is not the case that every 
choice between live and paper procedures involves a potential loss of 
expressive opportunity for a party. Some pretrial hearings, for in-
stance, will turn on questions of fact that do not implicate the parties’ 
own knowledge or involve questions of law to which testimony will 
not be relevant. A classic example of this would be a Daubert motion, 
in which the only question for a court is whether an expert witness 
should be allowed to testify at a trial on the merits.126 Although the 
                                                            
 122.  MacCoun, supra note 108, at 192 (describing the study reported in E. ALLAN LIND, 
ARBITRATING HIGH-STAKES CASES: AN EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN A 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT (RAND 1990)). 
 123.  Id. at 192-93. 
 124.  See supra Part II. 
 125.  See Sporer & Schwandt, supra note 42, at 24-27 (noting that certain behaviors 
commonly associated with deception are not correlated to untruthfulness). 
 126.  See FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 
585 (1993). 
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court will need to resolve issues of fact in such a setting, the parties’ 
testimony will not be needed. And although the potential expert witness 
might wish to have some expressive input before a court makes its 
decision, a court might justly decide that the subjective preferences of 
a paid professional witness weigh less heavily than the need to accu-
rately determine the admissibility question. So if the court thought 
that a paper-based procedure was superior in such a setting, sub-
jective fairness concerns would be unlikely to suggest a different result.127 
 Parties with an attenuated personal connection to their disputes 
may likewise experience little loss of satisfaction when courts employ 
paper-based fact-finding procedures. Perhaps the simplest way in 
which such a situation would arise would be when one party’s con-
nection to its claim is purely financial. Consider, for instance, an in-
surer bringing a subrogated claim on behalf of its insured. For one 
thing, the insurer is itself an artificial legal entity that cannot per-
sonally experience anything we would recognize as satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction with procedures. For another, its owners and agents—
who are capable of feeling such feelings—can be expected to have a 
less intense connection with a disputed matter, given that such dis-
putes are a routine part of their day-to-day work and that decisions 
about such disputes will not reflect on their past conduct or blame-
fulness. To be sure, the owners and agents of business associations 
will sometimes feel very strongly about the subjects of their compa-
nies’ lawsuits,128 but we can expect a significant volume of “mundane” 
litigation arising out of business transactions in which some of the 
parties may view the process as a chore rather than an opportunity 
for expression. 
 Finally, it is worth noting that in many cases, a paper trial proce-
dure will in fact be satisfaction-enhancing because it will take the 
place of a settlement process rather than a more expressive live hear-
ing or trial. As will be discussed in more detail below, paper-based 
procedures may save significant litigation costs for parties.129 In some 
cases, this cost-reduction may encourage the parties to seek a judicial 
determination of the merits of their dispute rather than settle their 
case.130 The arbitration context provides a useful example of such a 
process, in that the lowered costs of arbitration make it more likely 
                                                            
 127.  Note, however, that the clarity-enhancing virtues of live testimony might still counsel 
in favor of a live Daubert hearing, at least if the testimony in question is fairly complex. 
 128.  Cf. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 907 (2010) (noting 
that most corporations are relatively small and not particularly wealthy). One can imagine, 
for instance, that the owner of a small business could take being sued by a regular cus-
tomer quite personally.  
 129.  See infra Part IV. 
 130.  See E. ALLAN LIND, ARBITRATING HIGH-STAKES CASES: AN EVALUATION OF COURT-
ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN A UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 63 (RAND 1990) (noting that 
the lowered costs of arbitration hearings have this effect).  
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that parties will press their claims in such a forum than they would if 
they could only obtain relief in court.131 Arbitrating parties, on aver-
age, experience greater process satisfaction than those whose cases 
are confined to the court system,132 and this may stem, in part, from 
the fact that arbitration “gives litigants something that they want . . . 
an opportunity to have their cases adjudicated.”133 In other words, 
most parties probably prefer to get a chance to make their complaints 
in an authoritative forum, and they will lose such an opportunity if 
pushed to settle their cases due to the high cost of litigating. To the 
extent that non-hearing procedures can realize a similar cost reduc-
tion as arbitration, we might expect a similar gain in overall satisfac-
tion, especially if the process is designed in a transparent way. 
 Having said this, there are no doubt many potential hearings or 
trials in which parties have a strong emotional tie with the dispute, 
in which a live hearing will be less expensive than a paper-based pro-
cedure, and in which the parties can be expected to offer evidence. 
In such cases, litigants might experience a significant loss of expres-
sive opportunity and therefore view the overall process as less fair. 
The question, then, is whether paper-based fact-finding will feel so 
unfair in such cases that we should reject it even when it has strong 
accuracy advantages. 
 Happily, a well-designed paper procedure will probably allow 
enough litigant participation that any loss of satisfaction will be min-
imal. For one thing, the “bureaucratic black box” characterization of 
the paper trial process depends on the assumption that the non-
hearing process, and the reasons for it, are not transparent to liti-
gants. But if the court explains the reasons for using a paper-based 
procedure, casting the overall goal as one of fairness and the avoidance 
of bias, the likelihood that the parties will lose confidence in the fairness 
of the overall process should be reduced.134 Indeed, so long as proce-
dures involve a certain baseline level of party control and participa-
tion, smaller levels of participation variation seem to have little or no 
effect on satisfaction rates.135 Moreover, the parties’ perceptions that 
                                                            
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. at 44-45. 
 133.  Id. at 63; see also O’Hear, supra note 116, at 425 (noting that parties value voice 
even when they are engaging in a process of negotiation in which they have strong deci-
sional control). 
 134.  See Bone, supra note 100, at 339 (noting that litigants already accept some loss of 
voice due to existing non-party preclusion rules and that giving “reasons” for such preclu-
sion may affect their willingness to regard such rules as legitimate).  
 135.  See E. ALLAN LIND ET AL., THE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE: TORT LITIGANTS’ VIEWS OF 
TRIAL, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION, AND JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES 62 (1989). 
Lind specifically examined three types of dispute resolution procedures—judicial trials, 
arbitrations, and judicially mediated settlement conferences—and found that within this 
subset of procedures, variations in felt participation did not correlate significantly with 
satisfaction levels. Id. When compared with Tyler’s much broader survey of public experi-
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the court will hear and consider their arguments may be increased by 
an explanation of how the court has reached its decision, with an em-
phasis on its consideration of all the evidence that the parties have 
submitted. Such an explanation might reassure parties that their 
arguments are still attended to even if they have not been heard. 
 Finally, if we are still concerned that litigants will find a paper 
procedure unfair, it may help to provide them with additional expres-
sive opportunities that will give them a sense of having been heard 
without affecting the outcome. Taking inspiration from Lind’s work-
load-assignment study, a court might allow the parties to personally 
summarize their cases in open court at the time it announces its de-
cision.136 Although this procedure will likely be viewed less favorably 
by the parties than one in which it is clear that their arguments can 
impact the outcome of the case,137 it might still reduce their discom-
fort with an accuracy-enhancing procedure to an acceptable level. 
 In summary, although significant legitimacy issues are at stake 
when we choose between live and paper-based fact-finding proce-
dures, it seems unlikely that there will be a significant loss in litigant 
satisfaction from employing paper-based methods. Indeed, when 
choosing between live and paper-based trials, the paper procedure 
may enhance litigant satisfaction if it can lower costs enough that 
parties who would otherwise have settled will instead obtain a judi-
cial decision on the merits of their cases. But even in settings where 
the cost difference may not have this effect,138 such as early pretrial 
fact-finding, any deficiencies of a paper procedure might be reduced 
to acceptable levels by providing litigants outlets for personal expres-
sion short of a full hearing, by explaining the reasons for the proce-
dure in understandable terms, and by making it clear that the rea-
sons for eschewing live presentation are grounded in the desire for 
accuracy rather than in judicial disinterest. In short, when paper-
based procedures are more accurate than the live alternative, they 
can probably be made to feel fair enough to be acceptable to litigants. 
V.   OTHER PRAGMATIC CONSIDERATIONS:  COST, DELAY, AND  
AGENCY CONCERNS 
 In assessing the value of hearings, cost is a variable that we can-
not ignore.139 Relying on values such as accuracy and subjective fair-
                                                                                                                                           
ences with police and courts, this suggests that variations in expressive input matter less 
within a relatively high-participation and high-formality subset of dispute resolution pro-
cedures than among the much broader range of dispute resolution possibilities. 
 136.  See MacCoun, supra note 108, at 192-93; Lind et al., supra note 121, at 956. 
 137.  See Lind et al., supra note 121, at 956. 
 138.  See discussion infra Part IV. 
 139.  See also MARILYN J. BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL ADVOCACY 2 (1988) (warning law-
yers that their advocacy will always be constrained by their client’s cost concerns). 
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ness alone, we would develop a warped theory. This is easiest to see 
in the simple example of a case in which the “outcome . . . includes a 
damage award that reflects an accurate application of the substan-
tive law to the facts,” but the “plaintiff who was entitled to prevail 
had to pay more in attorneys’ fees than the value of the judgment.”140 
Nor is cost only relevant in such extreme circumstances. High litiga-
tion costs for defendants (even if less than the amount in contro-
versy) can incentivize strike suits even when those defendants are 
innocent of wrongdoing.141 And higher litigation costs generally en-
courage parties to settle claims rather than pursue them to trial; if 
we are concerned about the lack of authoritative adjudications of 
claims (perhaps due to the potential stagnation of the law or the se-
crecy of resulting settlement amounts), then this is an additional 
downside of high costs.142 Moreover, the effect of litigation costs on 
settlement decisions produces a secondary cost. As discussed above, 
parties who are pushed towards settlement are likely to feel deprived 
of an opportunity to present their case to a decisionmaker and to 
view the overall procedure as less legitimate.143 Finally, absent any 
other effects, any unnecessary costs—that is, any costs not offset by 
an increase in accuracy or subjective satisfaction with the litigation 
process—are simply a deadweight loss.144 
 The balance between fairness considerations and litigation costs 
cannot be formulated in simple mathematical terms, however. The 
problem is that most of the key variables are subject to significant 
uncertainty. As we have already seen, the use of hearings in a deci-
sionmaking process is not likely to consistently improve accuracy or 
reduce it; rather, the impact will depend on a number of case-specific 
factors, including the degree to which the dispute hinges upon credi-
bility, the degree to which the parties or witnesses on one side of the 
dispute may gain an advantage due to biasing appearance factors, 
the amount of preparation that has occurred before the hearing, and 
the amount of confusion inherent in the existing record.145 The prob-
lem is exacerbated because we lack existing data on the degree of bi-
as that hearings may induce, or the amount of clarity they may pro-
vide, either in general or in the relevant subsets of case-types. So al-
though we can easily articulate a goal—that we would like to balance 
the benefits of hearing procedures against their costs—we can do so 
only in a general way, without being able to do any explicit balancing. 
                                                            
 140.  Solum, supra note 25, at 185. 
 141.  Cf. Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading Equation, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 90, 148 (2009). 
 142.  See BURNS, supra note 4, at 112-35; Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE 
L.J. 1073, 1085-87 (1984). 
 143.  See LIND, supra note 130, at 44-45, 63; see also discussion supra Part III. 
 144.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 549 (4th ed. 1992). 
 145.  See discussion supra Parts II, III. 
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 The foregoing also assumes something that is far from clear: that 
holding a hearing necessarily makes litigation more expensive. To 
some extent, such an assumption is implicit in the many legal rules 
that allow judges to dispense with live procedures when deciding is-
sues that are legally frivolous.146 Hearings and trials, in this framing, 
should be dispensed with in easy cases but used in hard ones. Those 
who rely on this framing seem to assume two things. The first as-
sumption is that live procedures will either improve, or have at worst 
have no effect on, the accuracy of a resulting decision; we therefore 
are obliged to use them whenever the outcome of a case is in doubt. 
The second assumption is that live procedures are more expensive 
than alternative decisionmaking methods; we therefore should dis-
pense with them in cases whose outcome is clear. As we have seen, 
the first assumption is flawed because live testimony may reduce the 
accuracy of decisions where a case is close due to a difficult credibility 
contest. The second assumption is likewise flawed. Live procedures 
will sometimes add costs to decisionmaking, but will at other times 
be less expensive than paper-based fact-finding. 
A.   The Court’s Perspective 
 First, we must consider the ways in which a decision between a 
live and a paper-based procedure impacts a court. A judge, as well as 
other court employees, must take time away from other business in 
order to sit and hear evidence. The relevant unit of expense, for our 
purposes, is time. Most court staff, including judges, are salaried per-
sonnel who must allocate a limited budget of time between a number 
of competing cases. Nor is the concern merely for the work-
satisfaction of government employees; a backlog of court-time can 
result in a lengthy queue for case consideration. Such queues, in 
turn, give rise to social distress. Litigants who must wait many 
months or years for a decision may become embittered or be hindered 
in their ability to plan their future conduct due to lingering uncer-
tainty, and members of the general public may lose respect for a judicial 
system that imposes lengthy delays between questions and answers.147  
 In some circumstances, a judge can save court time by holding a 
live hearing or trial. One such situation would occur when the evi-
                                                            
 146.  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 56; Rules Governing Section 2254 and 2255 Cases in the 
United States District Courts 4 (2010). 
 147.  See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 102, 104 Stat. 5089 
(“The courts, the litigants, the litigants' attorneys, and the Congress and the executive 
branch, share responsibility for cost and delay in civil litigation and its impact on access to 
the courts, adjudication of cases on the merits, and the ability of the civil justice system to 
provide proper and timely judicial relief for aggrieved parties.”). But see LIND ET AL., supra 
note 135, at 54-55, 77-78 (noting that, when litigants have access to relatively formal 
methods of dispute resolution subject to “moderate levels of delay,” their satisfaction was 
affected by their perceptions of delay, but did not vary based on the actual duration of their cases). 
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dence in the record is confusing or ambiguous. Imagine that a key 
witness has been vague on an important point in his affidavit or dep-
osition testimony. Rather than slowly puzzle through the record, 
comparing this problematic testimony with other, possibly conflicting 
evidence, a judge might chose to hear live testimony instead. By do-
ing so, she can ensure that the witness will be pinned down on the 
presently vague point, either through cross-examination or, if neces-
sary, by the judge’s own questions.148 Similarly, a court may be able 
to economize by holding a live hearing when a record is complete but 
still very complex or hard to follow. Imagine, for instance, a case in 
which the key evidence is scattered through numerous documents 
and depositions, and in which the parties’ briefing has failed to give a 
coherent guide through the maze.149 By requesting a hearing, a judge 
may force advocates to winnow down a scattershot presentation into 
a smaller number of key arguments.150 And even if the advocates 
themselves are unable or unwilling to offer a coherent presentation 
at a hearing, a judge can use focused questioning to pin down a recal-
citrant attorney, forcing them to either make their claims clear or 
risk waiver.151   
 In practice, these cost savings will interact with the accuracy ad-
vantages of hearings discussed earlier. To the extent that a judge is 
dealing with a confusing record, a decision on a paper record may in-
volve a choice between accuracy and cost: A careful parsing of the 
record may reveal all the information that would be sought in a hear-
ing but only at the cost of a large expenditure of court time. Likewise, 
the cost-savings described above can be avoided by making a decision 
following a relatively brief review of the written submissions, forcing 
the parties to bear the accuracy costs of vague or confusing filings. 
The advantage of hearings in such a circumstance, strictly speaking, 
is not that they necessarily either save costs or reduce error rates, 
but rather that they avoid a trade-off between these two quantities. 
Likewise, this analysis is subject to the caveat that some judges may 
be able to economize when deciding a case on a paper record by rely-
                                                            
 148.  See FED. R. EVID. 614. 
 149.  See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 
1117-18 (E.D. Penn. 1981), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), 
rev’d, 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (describing the “veritable odyssey,” lasting twenty-three months, 
that the district court endured while reviewing an enormous summary judgment re-
cord in an antitrust case). 
 150.  See LUBET, supra note 69, at 347 (advising attorneys to “do everything they can to 
shorten” their opening statements during a bench trial, eschewing repetition in favor of 
giving “a clear picture of the occurrences” in the case); FEDERAL PRACTICE MANUAL FOR 
LEGAL AID ATTORNEYS, supra note 66, at 148 (advising advocates that their oral presenta-
tions should be brief and should not assume that the judge has comprehended all the mate-
rial in the briefings). 
 151.  This strategy is not, however, without its own dangers. Past a certain point, sim-
plification might leave out crucial details. A court, therefore, should be more reluctant to 
pursue this strategy if the case seems complex despite, and not because of, the written advocacy. 
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ing more on the work of law clerks; hearing live testimony, by con-
trast, cannot be effectively delegated. But to the extent that the judge 
will ultimately wish (or need) to carefully consider the relevant evi-
dence personally, live testimony may be the more efficient solution in 
cases involving either highly complex information or under-
performing advocates. 
 By contrast, in many cases these benefits will not be present. 
Many simple civil cases involve a relatively clear dispute that can 
easily be gleaned from a paper record. Imagine, for example, a car-
crash case in which the dispute centers on conflicting testimony 
about whether a motorist signaled before entering a lane. If the par-
ties and witnesses have been effectively deposed, a hearing may 
merely repeat information that can easily be gleaned from a few 
short deposition excerpts.  
 Add to this a factor not previously addressed: Not all live fact-
finding procedures involve the same degree of requisite formality. For 
instance, although bench trials will generally be more streamlined 
than a full jury trial, they will often be more complex than a run-of-
the-mill pretrial hearing, incorporating opening statements, case-
presentations by each participating party, and possibly final argu-
ment.152 So the cost-variable depends, in part, on what law, tradition, 
and the participants will find to be an acceptable live procedure. In 
the car-crash example, this variable means that a judge offered the 
chance to choose between a paper trial and a bench-trial may find 
that the added formality of a “trial” counts against it when the ex-
pense of the two modes of proceeding are at issue.  
 So, from a court’s perspective, the cost equation boils down to an-
swering the following questions: First, how long will a hearing take—
can it be a short, simple affair, or will a lengthy process be necessary? 
Second, how hard will it be to decide a case on a paper record—is the 
briefing easy to follow and the evidence clear, or complex and hard-
to-follow? Finally, will the hearing make it possible to cut through 
ambiguous factual disputes with focused questions, or pin down ad-
vocates on disputed facts?153   
                                                            
 152.  LUBET, supra note 69 at 346-47 (Bench trials sometimes, but not always, include 
opening statements and final arguments, although judges tend to prefer that such presen-
tations be shorter in the absence of a jury.). 
 153.  The perspective of a rulemaker is not discussed in detail in this section, but a few 
points may usefully be added. First, rulemakers will often be concerned with minimizing 
costs to both courts and parties. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (instructing courts to interpret 
the federal rules of civil procedure to “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determina-
tion of every action and proceeding”). Beyond a direct concern about costs, rulemakers may 
also have preferences regarding the frequency with which cases should be resolved via 
settlement or via judicial decision. Compare, e.g., Fiss, supra note 142, at 1085-87, with 
FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a) (permitting courts to order pretrial conferences for several purposes, 
one of which is “facilitating settlement”). To the extent that one type of decision procedure 
has a higher cost to parties than another, parties may be given an extra incentive to settle 
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B.   The Litigant’s and Witness’s Perspective 
 The court is not the only relevant actor, however. We must also 
assess the impact of live procedures on the parties and witnesses. 
The witness perspective is perhaps the easiest to inhabit. Courts 
rarely travel to hold hearings, but lawyers often travel to conduct 
depositions, so a live hearing or trial will often involve the time and 
expense of traveling to court in order to testify. Likewise, lawyers 
may often feel the need to prepare witnesses more intensely for cross-
examination in court than for a deposition, so a witness may find the 
deposition-preparation more congenial.154 And of course, if the ques-
tion is whether to hold a live trial after a witness has already been 
thoroughly deposed, the cost equation for the witness is clear: Paper 
procedures are preferable to a second round of testimony. 
 To some extent, the witness’s concerns might be partially mollified 
by a modification of hearing procedures, rather than by an elimina-
tion of hearings. If a hearing can be conducted telephonically, for in-
stance, the travel burden for a witness might be reduced.155 In the 
end, however, such adjustments cannot make hearings a favorable 
bargain for witnesses in most cases. Courts may often be reluctant to 
modify the formal presentation of a bench trial to allow for telephonic 
testimony, and even if they are not, the desire of attorneys to prepare 
witnesses to testify directly to a court may involve preparation bur-
dens that make even telephonic testimony a bad bargain. So, from 
the perspective of a non-party witness, a paper procedure will nor-
mally be preferable to a hearing.156 
 For parties, the answer is less obvious. If the parties are financing 
their own lawsuits (rather than via a contingent fee arrangement or 
an insurance agreement), one obvious interest is in limiting the ex-
tent of attorney’s fees.157 Paper procedures have some advantages in 
                                                                                                                                           
their claims in order to avoid the higher-cost procedure. So if rulemakers generally wish to 
incentivize settlements, this may be viewed as a silver-lining to the higher-cost procedure.  
 154.  It is possible that the amount of deposition preparation would increase if the law-
yer knew beforehand that the deposition transcript was to be used in a paper trial; some of 
the preparation costs, in other words, might shift in response to a rise in the willingness of 
courts to use paper trials. Nevertheless, this increase might be modest; parties already 
develop depositions with an eye towards either making or defending against a summary 
judgment motion, which gives an already large incentive to extract as much evidence as 
possible in the time allotted.  
 155.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a) (permitting the court, “[f]or good cause in compelling 
circumstances and with appropriate safeguards,” to “permit testimony in open court by 
contemporaneous transmission from a different location”). 
 156.  If the witness is testifying as an expert, however, the costs will be shifted to the 
party paying the expert witness fees. See THOMAS A. MAUET, PRETRIAL 357 (5th ed. 2002) 
(noting that these costs “can be substantial since medical and other technical experts usu-
ally command hourly rates comparable to that of lawyers” and that such expenses are fur-
ther exacerbated if the expert witness needs to be flown in). 
 157.  See id. (noting a five-day case, requiring five days of preparation time, can easily 
cost $10,000 in attorney’s fees alone, exclusive of other costs). 
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this regard. Lawyers working in firms may be willing to delegate the 
taking of depositions to younger associates, but they are likely to be 
reluctant to delegate in-court witness examinations. Likewise, even 
in complex cases, law partners regularly delegate motion-writing and 
exhibit-collection tasks to younger and cheaper attorneys but insist 
on practicing and then presenting their own in-court arguments.  
 This cost-savings may be counterbalanced, to some extent, by the 
court-perspective discussed above: Courts may save time in complex 
cases by having attorneys and witnesses present in court, where they 
(hopefully) present streamlined arguments and testimony and where 
the judge can ask follow-up questions. The court, in other words, can 
save time in complex cases, but at the cost of imposing more expense 
on the parties who are likely to end up paying higher fees to finance 
the simplified presentation.158  
 However, live fact-finding procedures may introduce burdens for 
parties that are not so counterbalanced. One additional concern that 
a litigant may have when an issue will be decided following a hearing 
or trial is an increased chance of waiver of a legal or procedural right 
by his attorney during the encounter.159 When appearing in court, 
lawyers are subject to a substantial cognitive load: They must ad-
vance the goals of their client, keep a great deal of information organ-
ized in their head, respond to changing circumstances, and remain 
alert for potential violations of evidentiary or procedural rules that 
may worsen their client’s litigation position. Moreover, the ability of 
lawyers working together on a team to solve problems collaboratively 
is reduced by the necessity of nominating one advocate at a time to 
conduct the presentation of arguments and the examination of wit-
nesses, as well as by the necessity of confining communications be-
tween team members to scribbled notes and whispers. Under such 
conditions, it is sensible for a client to worry that her lawyer may, 
through a lapse of attention or through not possessing the knowledge 
or insight of another team member, inadvertently waive the client’s 
rights to object to evidentiary errors or procedural violations.  
 Live procedures, in other words, may reduce the ability of attor-
neys to be the best possible agents for their clients. This difficulty 
                                                            
 158.  As discussed supra at Part III, such higher costs may also have collateral conse-
quences for the parties’ subjective assessments of procedural fairness if they push parties 
into settling claims rather than pursuing them to a judicial decision. Because people gen-
erally value the opportunity to voice their grievances during a dispute resolution process, 
they may find the overall process less satisfying if they are pushed to settle their cases, to 
the extent that the negotiation process does not incorporate opportunities for voice. See 
LIND, supra note 130, at 63; O’Hear, supra note 116, at 420-21.  
 159.  See L. RONALD JORGESON, MOTION PRACTICE AND PERSUASION 21-23 (2006) (not-
ing that an important goal during trial-court proceedings is to preserve issues for appellate 
review and that useful appellate arguments are often “seemingly minor legal issues tucked 
away in the record,” in contrast to the evidentiary arguments that seem important during 
a hearing or trial). 
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likely results in increased litigation costs, as clients hire higher qual-
ity, but more expensive, counsel in an attempt to prevent such lapses 
from occurring. It might also result in a loss of control by the client 
over the litigation, as lawyers fail to operate in the manner that the 
client would prefer. In either event, a litigant would view the hearing 
as having worsened her position.160  
 So in the end, a number of financial factors will make parties and 
witnesses tend to favor paper procedures over live ones: the costs of 
travel, the costs of preparing for live testimony, the added cost of 
lawyer preparation time (due to the likely involvement of more senior 
counsel when a presentation will be made to a court), and the in-
creased risk of inadvertent waiver due to the cognitive and emotional 
stress of the live environment.161 These concerns must be weighed 
against the cost savings that courts may achieve by holding a hearing 
or trial in cases where doing so will result in a simplified or clearer 
picture of the dispute. In some cases, the party and witness concerns 
might be minimized: The witnesses might be local or be able to be 
examined telephonically, the attorney might be a solo practitioner 
with a reputation as a skilled oral advocate and a preference for live 
presentation, and the client might have faith in the attorney’s ability 
to faithfully protect his interests in that environment. But in many 
cases, the general intuition that live procedures add costs will be ac-
curate: The evidence may be clear on the existing record, witness 
travel may be necessary, the live procedure may draw more senior 
(and hence more expensive) counsel to the case and result in more 
elaborate witness preparation, and the live environment may lead to an 
increased risk that attorneys will unwittingly waive their clients’ rights.  
                                                            
 160.  It is possible, and indeed likely, that some advocates will not suffer such a “live 
procedure” performance deficit. Indeed, advocates whose time is spent primarily doing in-
court work may be more effective in court than they are on paper. Cf. Robert P. Mosteller, 
Why Defense Attorneys Cannot, But Do, Care About Innocence, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 
45 (2010) (noting that some court-appointed lawyers are better paid for in-court time than 
out-of-court time, and have a corresponding incentive to minimize pretrial work and to 
seek trial time instead). This is mostly likely to be true for lawyers who specialize in fields 
that involve a relatively large proportion of trial time; the majority of lawyers, by contrast, 
spend far more time out of court than in it, and so are unlikely to have developed such 
lopsided skill sets. See Luis Garicano & Thomas N. Hubbard, Specialization, Firms, and 
Markets: The Division of Labor within and between Law Firms, 25 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 339, 
345 (2009) (showing that those lawyers who on average spend more than ten days a month 
in court—working in the fields of personal injury, divorce, and criminal law—make up less 
than a quarter of the total population of lawyers, based on census data). 
 161.  Some evidence suggests that they do, in fact, have this preference: Written sum-
mary judgment practice has become much more common than oral trial practice in the 
federal courts. See BURNS, supra note 4, at 84. Parties who could choose either to file a 
written dispositive motion or proceed directly towards trial, in other words, seem to prefer 
the written procedure, and to settle their cases rather than face the live hearing. 
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VI.   THEORY RESTATEMENT, APPLICATIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS  
FOR REFORM 
 Having examined three critical concerns that are implicated when 
a decisionmaker must choose between live and paper-based proce-
dures—accuracy, subjective fairness, and costs—we can now place 
these concerns side by side and examine how they interact in actual 
case scenarios. Some traditional uses of hearings and paper-based 
decisions may be sensible, even if the traditional justifications for one 
or the other were founded on mistaken notions about the utility of 
demeanor evidence; in other settings, we may not be so lucky. In this 
section, we will examine four examples in which a judge might have 
the discretion162 to choose either to hold a hearing or trial, or to find 
facts on a paper record: A preliminary-injunction decision, an auto-
mobile negligence case in small-claims court, a toxic-tort bench trial, 
and a civil rape bench trial. These examples will help to illustrate 
that live procedure generally works better early in the life of a case 
than later on. I will then offer some proposals for rule reform to en-
courage judges to employ live procedure when it is useful and avoid it 
when it is harmful. 
A.   Theory Restatement 
 Before we consider these examples, it may be useful to restate 
briefly some of the considerations that may help us choose between 
live and paper-based procedures: 
 Detecting Deceptive and Erroneous Testimony: Demeanor evi-
dence is unlikely to aid the court in making credibility determina-
tions. In some cases, live cross-examination may assist the court in 
deciding credibility, but that utility will be limited to the extent that 
witnesses have had significant opportunities to rehearse their testi-
mony with lawyers who are aware of the likely subjects of cross-
examination. If a transcript of a well-conducted deposition is avail-
able, it will usually be a more reliable and a fairer basis for determin-
ing whether a witness is testifying truthfully than live testimony. 
 Avoiding Unnecessary Appearance-Induced Bias: If a hearing or 
trial will introduce the court to parties or witnesses for the first time, 
it is likely that a court’s view of the evidence will be colored by irrele-
vant factors arising from visual and aural contact with witnesses. 
These concerns include the biasing effects of witness attractiveness, 
social status, and educational level, as well as in-group/out-group ef-
fects based on the similarities and differences between the judge and 
the witnesses. 
                                                            
 162. For the purpose of simplification, we shall assume that these cases are arising 
either in a forum where there is no right to a jury trial or that the parties have elected to 
try their cases to the bench.  
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 Clarifying Complex or Confusing Evidence: Live procedures may 
induce parties to offer a simplified portrait of the issues before the 
court. They may also give the court an opportunity to pin down vague 
or confusing witnesses through sua sponte witness-interrogation by 
the court. In cases where complexity is more of a problem than credi-
bility, this counsels in favor of live proceedings. 
 Subjective Perceptions of Fairness: All other things being equal, 
hearings may be more satisfying to parties who have the opportunity 
to testify during the proceedings, given the value people place on 
voicing grievances in connection with dispute resolution procedures. 
Variations in satisfaction are likely to be modest, however, so long as 
the paper procedure is relatively formal and respects the dignity of 
litigants. Any deficits will be lowered further if the litigants view the 
case as a business matter rather than an opportunity for personal 
vindication. Furthermore, paper procedures may make the overall 
litigation feel fairer when live procedures will be the more expensive 
approach, largely because of the increased likelihood of a voice-less 
settlement negotiation if an expensive hearing is the only option. 
When litigants are likely to find a paper-based procedure unfair, this 
concern may be partially mitigated by a court’s efforts to explain the 
accuracy and fairness benefits of paper-based procedures to parties 
and to justify its decisions by reference to the arguments actually of-
fered by those parties. Finally, the parties’ desire for voice may also 
be partially satisfied by opportunities to speak that occur after the 
court has reached its decision. 
 Court Costs: Employing a paper procedure will sometimes save 
valuable court time, helping a court to maintain an efficient pace in 
moving through its docket. When a case involves a large amount of 
technical evidence, the court may end up reviewing documents no 
matter what, and a hearing or trial may simply be a duplication of 
time. Paper-based decisions may also allow a court to delegate more 
of the effort to law clerks, which may sometimes provide efficiency 
advantages. On the other hand, when the evidence in a case is vague 
or hard to follow, hearings may save court time by allowing a court to 
ask its own questions. 
 Other Costs: Witnesses will generally prefer paper procedures, at 
least if they will need to travel to attend a hearing or trial. Parties 
who find it difficult to monitor their counsel’s performance may ap-
preciate having an opportunity to observe their efforts in court. But 
oftentimes, parties will find this advantage outweighed by the added 
attorney costs that arise from preparing for a live procedure—
including the likelihood of being billed for the time of more senior at-
torneys and the increased agency costs that arise in the in-court liti-
gation environment. 
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 With these principles in mind, let us consider how they might ap-
ply in some real-world examples. 
B.   The Preliminary Injunction Motion 
 For our first example, let us consider a motion for a preliminary 
injunction under Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a 
setting in which the district court often has nearly unfettered discre-
tion to choose between live and paper-based fact-finding procedures. 
Parties usually seek preliminary injunctions “to preserve the status 
quo” until the case can be definitively resolved by settlement, pretrial 
dismissal, or a trial on the merits.163 Following a long tradition of fed-
eral equity practice, district judges generally have broad discretion to 
grant or deny such injunctions,164 and the rule is silent regarding the 
methods of proving the facts necessary to determine whether an in-
junction is appropriate.165 District courts may therefore decide for 
themselves, in many cases, whether to rely on affidavit evidence166 or 
employ an evidentiary hearing.167 To the degree this discretion is con-
strained, it is by the traditional view of American courts that oral 
hearings are necessary when the credibility of conflicting testimony 
must be decided. In such cases, some courts of appeals (but not all) 
will find that the failure to hold a hearing constituted an abuse of 
discretion, unless both parties have consented to an affidavit-based 
decision.168 For the purposes of this discussion, however, let us as-
sume that the district court sits in a circuit, like the Ninth Circuit, 
where it can freely choose between hearings and paper-based proce-
dures, so as to focus on the underlying question of policy. 
                                                            
 163.  Penn v. San Juan Hospital, Inc., 528 F.2d 1181, 1185 (10th Cir. 1975); see also 
11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 2947 (2d ed. 1995). 
 164.  See WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 163. Courts will typically weigh a num-
ber of factors in concluding whether a preliminary injunction is in the interest of justice, 
including: “the significance of the threat of irreparable harm to plaintiff if the injunction is 
not granted,” the amount of harm the injunction would cause the defendant, the likelihood 
that the “plaintiff will succeed on the merits,” and “the public interest.” Id. at § 2948. 
 165.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 43(c). Unless the parties stipulate all 
relevant facts or unless the losing party’s arguments are insufficient as a matter of law, 
some fact-finding will be necessary, as district courts will not rely on the unproven allega-
tions in a pleading to justify injunctive relief. See WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 
163, at § 2949 & n.12 (collecting cases). 
 166.  See, e.g., S. F.-Oakland Newspaper Guild v. Kennedy, 412 F.2d 541, 546 (9th Cir. 1969). 
 167.  See, e.g., Wounded Knee Legal Def./Offense Comm. v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 
507 F.2d 1281, 1287 (8th Cir. 1974); see also Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 862 F.2d 890, 894 
(1st Cir. 1988) (stating that, in some cases, the use of a paper trial to decide fact disputes 
relating to a preliminary injunction motion was within a district court’s discretion, but that 
an oral hearing is preferable whenever there is doubt that a party can fairly present its 
case via affidavits). 
 168.  See WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 163, at § 2949 & n.29 (collecting cases 
and discussing this rule). But see, e.g., S.F.-Oakland Newspaper Guild, 412 F.2d at 546 
(applying contrary Ninth Circuit rule). 
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 In most cases, the theory of hearings outlined above would suggest 
that an evidentiary hearing is more useful at this stage of the case 
than a decision that relies only on affidavits, at least if the factual 
disputes are reasonably complex. Although some point to a need to 
consider demeanor evidence to resolve fact conflicts in this setting,169 
this argument is relatively weak given that such evidence is more 
likely to decrease the accuracy of credibility calls in this setting than it is 
to increase it.170 But many other factors do weigh in favor of a hearing.  
 First, there are the other accuracy considerations. Although the 
demeanor problem exists as much here as in other cases, it is coun-
teracted to an extent by the increased utility of cross-examination at 
this relatively early stage. Witnesses will likely receive less coaching, 
and have less access to the other side’s evidence and arguments, in 
preparation for such a hearing,171 so cross-examination may be more 
likely to usefully ferret out fabrications and mistakes in their testi-
mony. This advantage becomes more apparent when we consider that 
the alternative is usually to rely on affidavit evidence rather than 
depositions: Affidavits, which do not require a witness to answer 
questions put forth by opposing counsel, may paper over the gaps in 
an account rather than probe them. The availability of cross-
examination therefore takes on special importance here. Further-
more, the judge may have little familiarity with the facts of the case 
at this early stage, so the ability to ask follow-up questions may be 
particularly helpful. 
 Second, there is the question of subjective fairness. As we have 
already seen, the desire of litigants for expressive opportunities can 
be furthered by giving them an opportunity to testify in court. The 
countervailing possibility—that the cost of the hearing will be high 
enough to force a settlement, thereby reducing opportunities for par-
ties to voice their complaints—does exist in this context, but to a 
lesser degree than in other cases, given that preliminary injunction 
hearings will usually be shorter—and involve less preparation—than 
trials.172 So, on balance, a hearing procedure will seem fairer to the 
litigants involved. 
 Finally, there is the question of cost. Some of the above defects in 
the efficacy of a paper procedure could be cured, no doubt, if we al-
lowed more extensive discovery (especially deposition practice) before 
                                                            
 169. WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 163, at § 2949.  
 170.  See supra Part II. 
 171.  See Lee T. Gesmer & Jay Shepard, Employee Non-Competition Agreements, in II MAS-
SACHUSETTS EMPLOYMENT LAW § 20.7.2 (John F. Adkins & Nancy S. Shilepsky eds., 2009) 
(noting that lawyers often have only “a few days” to prepare for preliminary injunction hearings). 
 172.  See discussion infra Part V.D-E; see also Gesmer & Shepard, supra note 171, at § 
20.7.2; Morton Denlow, The Motion for a Preliminary Injunction: Time for a Uniform Federal 
Standard, 22 REV. LITIG. 495, 507 (2003) (noting that such hearings are less formal than 
trials on the merits and involve the presentation of a smaller quantity of available evidence). 
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a preliminary injunction hearing. But such discovery would be im-
practical, given that the necessary delay would clash with the “haste 
that is often necessary to preserve the relative positions of the par-
ties and to protect the movant from irreparable injury.”173 Given the-
se time constraints, there is less reason to worry about the intense 
level of witness preparation that normally adds to the cost of live 
hearing procedures. Moreover, the less-formal nature of preliminary 
injunction hearings makes it more likely that the judge will allow 
cost-saving devices like the telephonic testimony of remote wit-
nesses.174 Finally, a hurried briefing schedule may make it more like-
ly that written submissions will have gaps or ambiguities; thus, it 
might save the court time to have a live hearing at which these gaps 
can be filled in, rather than having to puzzle over cryptic submissions 
in chambers. All in all, the preliminary injunction hearing is a situa-
tion in which the judicial instinct favoring live presentation is sound, 
even if the demeanor-focused reasoning underlying that instinct has 
little to recommend it. 
C.   The Case in Small Claims Court 
 Next, let us consider a setting in which cost considerations become 
paramount: the small-claims court. Every state has a forum in which 
relatively minor disputes, involving low amounts-in-controversy, are 
handled using “expedited and simpli[fied]” procedures.175 In this set-
ting, “traditional rules of evidence and court processes do not ap-
ply,”176 and the use of attorney representation is rarely cost-
effective—and sometimes, it is not permitted.177 One such simplified 
procedure is to use highly simplified pleadings,178 followed by an oral 
evidentiary hearing at which the pro se parties may testify and in-
troduce witness testimony or other evidence.179 
                                                            
 173.  Denlow, supra note 172, at 507. 
 174.  See id.  
 175.  Bruce Zucker & Monica Her, The People’s Court Examined: A Legal and Empirical 
Analysis of the Small Claims Court System, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 315, 317 (2003). The lowest 
jurisdictional limits for small claims courts in the United States are set at $1,000 (Vir-
ginia), while “the highest limits are in Georgia and Tennessee, with limits of $15,000.” Id. 
at 318. The mean limit is $4,504. Id. at 320 tbl.1. 
 176.  Id. at 317. 
 177.  Id. at 319, 327; see Scott Sabey & Tim Shea, Small Claims Court: A Conversation 
with Scott Sabey and Tim Shea, 19 UTAH B. J. (75th SPECIAL ANNIVERSARY ISSUE), no. 6, 
2006 at 32, 34 (noting that even after Utah raised its jurisdictional limit to $7,500, “rela-
tively few” parties in small claims court were represented by counsel). 
 178.  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 116.320 (Deering 1991 & Supp. 2009) (only re-
quiring a plaintiff to plead the names and addresses of the defendants, the dollar amount 
of the claim, and a simple description of its basis); see also Zucker & Her, supra note 175, 
at 325-29 (describing the California process); accord Sabey & Shea, supra note 177 at 32-33 
(describing similar Utah process). 
 179.  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 116.520 (Deering 1991). 
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 In such a setting, the live procedure is clearly the only sensible 
choice for dispute resolution, even if the dispute centers on a simple 
credibility conflict. First, the accuracy consequences of potentially 
misleading demeanor evidence are less severe; due to the amount-in-
controversy limits, the fiscal loss resulting from a mistaken decision 
is contained to relatively tolerable levels.180 What is more, the accu-
racy advantages of hearings may be more likely to show themselves 
in this context. Any briefing will be prepared by inexpert pro se par-
ties who do not know the relevant law and will likely be confusing, so 
that a judge’s own questions will take on a special utility. Further-
more, the likelihood that witnesses will have been carefully prepared 
for cross-examination is at its lowest in the small-claims setting, and 
even if the parties lack the skill to effectively cross-examine the wit-
nesses, the judge can provide some credibility-probing questioning of 
his own.181 These clarity-producing factors might outweigh the accu-
racy losses we can expect due to the impact of demeanor evidence on 
credibility determinations and the appearance-bias problem. 
 When we place the remaining factors on the scale, the answer is 
even clearer. As we have seen, litigants gain satisfaction from ex-
pressing their views to a decisionmaker. Nor is there any concern 
here that the added cost of a hearing will force parties into low-voice 
settlement negotiations: If anything, the cost equation runs the other 
way. In proceedings in which discovery is almost non-existent and 
lawyers rarely assist litigants, the preparation of an adequate record 
for a paper-based decision presents very high cost obstacles for liti-
gants; adding the necessary deposition practice and requiring the 
drafting of lengthy briefs might deter many parties from suing at all, 
due to the expense of hiring a lawyer or the information costs of 
learning how to handle such tasks personally. Oral hearings, therefore, 
turn out to be a clearly superior method of resolving very small claims. 
D.   The Toxic Tort Bench Trial 
 Now, let us turn our attention from preliminary or low-value mat-
ters to a category of cases in which the decision between live and pa-
per procedures will be much more challenging: The resolution of tort 
claims premised on exposure to allegedly dangerous chemicals. Such 
cases involve many added wrinkles beyond the “ordinary” trial; most 
                                                            
 180.  Note that to say this is not to suggest that the financial consequences of a mistake 
in a small case do not matter to the parties. But from an economic perspective, an in-
creased chance of losing a smaller amount of money is always preferable to a similar 
chance of losing a larger amount.  
 181.  See, e.g., Steve Averett, Small Claims Courts, 16 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 179, 183 (2001) 
(noting that in Utah, a small claims judge will be responsible for questioning witnesses); 
Gerald Lebovits, Small Claims Courts Offer Prompt Adjudication Based on Substantive 
Law, 70 N.Y. ST. B. J. 6, 10 (1998) (noting that in New York, small claims judges “tak[e] 
active charge of the proceedings and examining witnesses”).  
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significantly, from our perspective, plaintiffs will often have to estab-
lish, using scientific expert testimony, a causative link between expo-
sure to a particular substance and infirmities suffered many years 
later.182 Let us presume, for the sake of simplicity, that the parties 
have consented to a bench trial, and that they are willing to consider 
the use of a paper procedure in order to conserve costs. So the ques-
tion is presented squarely to the court: Is a paper trial the best way 
of resolving this case?183 
 Here, it will be hard to clearly decide between the procedures on 
the basis of accuracy criteria. For the sake of analysis, we can break 
down our hypothetical case into two important things that a plaintiff 
must prove. First, was she exposed to a chemical produced by the de-
fendant, and second, did that substance cause her subsequent mala-
dies?184 The first issue mainly involves historical proof—subject to 
significant uncertainty in the large subset of cases that involve a long 
latency period—with the same concerns we normally have regarding 
demeanor and appearance bias. The second issue, however, involves 
very little focus on the plaintiff’s credibility and instead requires a 
lengthy excursion into the arcana of scientific evidence. In such a set-
ting, the risk that paper briefing will be confusing or vague becomes 
more significant, and the value of dialogue between judges and ex-
pert witnesses rises. To a large extent, then, the accuracy inquiry will 
depend on which aspect of the case predominates: In some “mature” 
types of toxic torts, causation might be clearly established by prece-
dent, so that the main question is whether the plaintiff was exposed 
to the substance as a result of the defendant’s actions.185 Other cases, 
however, might involve a single supplier of a substance and little dis-
pute on exposure, with the inquiry turning entirely on the scientific 
causation question.186   
 What then of the other factors? Given the complexity described 
above, it should neither be surprising that toxic tort cases often last 
longer than the typical trial nor that the use of testifying scientific 
                                                            
 182.  See Jamie A. Grodsky, Genomics and Toxic Torts: Dismantling the Risk-Injury 
Divide, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1671, 1677-78 (2007); J. Michael Veron, The Trial of Toxic Torts: 
Scientific Evidence in the Wake of Daubert, 57 LA. L. REV. 647, 648-49 (1997). 
 183.  See Gingras v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 06 C 2195, 2007 WL 1052500, at *7 
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 4, 2007) (considering whether a paper trial was the best way of resolving a 
dispute even though all parties had consented to the procedure). 
 184.  Veron, supra note 182, at 648. 
 185.  See Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 
1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 343, 357 (providing modern asbestos claims as a paradigmatic 
example of such a “mature” toxic tort). 
 186.  See Young K. Lee, Note, Beyond Gatekeeping: Class Certification, Judicial Over-
sight, and the Promotion of Scientific Research in “Immature” Pharmaceutical Torts, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 1905, 1908-09 (2005) (describing the “immature” tort category, in which 
claims of scientific causation are novel and undeveloped in previous cases). 
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experts makes these long trials even more expensive.187 To the extent 
that a paper trial can reduce the need for lengthy witness-
preparation sessions, decrease the need for expensive court days, and 
shift some of the lawyering labor to lower-cost associates, we might 
plausibly expect it to create significant cost economies as compared 
with a live trial.188   
 By reducing the incentive to settle, the paper trial may increase 
voice opportunities as well.189 In some cases, the issue of voice will be 
of reduced significance, in particular in cases where the plaintiff 
would not be testifying even in a live proceeding.190 In others, a court 
will need to weigh the extent of possible cost reductions and their 
impact on likely voice opportunities, as well as any concerns about 
difficult credibility judgments being undermined by demeanor and 
appearance bias, against the clarity gains that a live hearing might 
provide to the scientific causation questions. To the extent that the 
parties are stipulating to a paper procedure, a court might decide 
reasonably that the cost factors are quite significant and that the 
voice opportunity favors a paper decision over no decision, which 
could indicate that a paper trial is preferable. But, in the end, it is 
the court that has to render a decision that will depend on a clear 
understanding of the scientific dispute in the case. So if the court 
finds itself significantly troubled by the difficulty of comprehending 
the scientific issues on briefs alone and by the inefficiencies of trying 
to do so without an opportunity to interact with the experts them-
selves, the call might reasonably go the other way. 
                                                            
 187.  See Judicial Conf. of the U.S., Rep. of the Judicial Conf. Ad Hoc Comm, on Asbestos 
Litigation 10-14 (1991) (describing the complexity and lengthiness of asbestos-exposure trials). 
 188.  One cost in particular where a significant economy could be realized is in the area 
of expert witness fees. For one thing, merely paying such witnesses to travel can be a sig-
nificant burden. See MAUET, supra note 156, at 357 (noting that the travel costs of expert 
witnesses can be substantial). Moreover, expert witnesses will already have prepared a 
written summary of their findings in most cases, see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B), making the 
additional costs of testifying duplicative of an already-prepared written submission. 
 189.  See discussion supra Part III. 
 190.  Testimony will be unlikely, for example, if the defendant has stipulated the issue 
of exposure and damages, or if these issues have already been resolved in the first half of a 
bifurcated proceeding. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b) (giving the District Courts discretion to try 
issues separately). On the flip side, however, we should not necessarily discount the impor-
tance of voice on the defendant’s side, even if the defendant party is a corporation that 
cannot “speak” in a literal sense. Although the nominal defendant may not have feelings or 
expectations that can be violated in a low-voice condition, it is nevertheless made up of 
individuals whose experiences should be counted in the procedural justice calculus. Cf. 
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 928 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(urging that “the individual person’s right to speak includes the right to speak in associa-
tion with other individual persons,” even if the form of association is a business corporation 
(emphasis omitted)). Indeed, to the extent that the perceived legitimacy of the proceedings 
implicates decree-following and law-compliance concerns, society’s interest in encouraging 
such compliance may be heightened when the party at issue is a powerful corporation.  
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E.   The Civil Rape Bench Trial 
  Finally, let us consider an example in which the accuracy interest 
and the subjective fairness interest collide with unusual severity: a 
civil rape trial.191 Victims of sexual assault appear to be raising such 
claims with increasing frequency,192 often suing both the claimed as-
sailant and third-party defendants who, they allege, failed to employ 
reasonable precautions to prevent sexual assaults on their prop-
erty.193 Although these claims might traditionally seem like obvious 
candidates for live, confrontational trials, paper procedures are ar-
guably superior in most instances. 
 First, the accuracy factor will generally favor a paper trial in these 
cases. The factual dispute in civil rape cases will often boil down to a 
simple swearing contest between the alleged victim and the alleged 
perpetrator.194 In many cases, the victim and the assailant will be 
acquaintances or intimates, and the defense will be that the sexual 
contact was consensual.195 The trier of fact will therefore be making a 
decision that hinges on whether the alleged victim or the alleged as-
sailant is a more credible witness.196   
 This is exactly the sort of case in which the live procedure is most 
likely to bias fair inferences regarding witness credibility. Nervous-
ness and discomfort at testifying might result in a hesitant delivery 
that appears deceptive,197 while a well-rehearsed, confident witness 
may inspire an amount of trust that is ill-deserved. Likewise, the 
possibility that judgments of credibility may be skewed in favor of those 
parties who are attractive, high-status, or who happen to share salient 
                                                            
 191.  Once again, for the sake of avoiding doctrinal complexities and focusing on the 
underlying policy question, we will assume that the parties have consented to a bench trial 
and are willing to consider a paper trial procedure. 
 192.  See Ellen M. Bublick, Tort Suits Filed by Rape and Sexual Assault Victims in Civil 
Courts: Lessons for Courts, Classrooms and Constituencies, 59 SMU L. REV. 55, 58-59 
(2006) (reporting a ten-fold increase in reported state-court appellate opinions on this sub-
ject between the early 1970s and the early 2000s). 
 193.  Id. at 61. 
 194.  See JEANNE C. MARSH, ALISON GEIST & NATHAN CAPLAN, RAPE AND THE LIMITS OF 
LAW REFORM 20-21, 35 (1982) (reporting data showing that less than half of the criminal 
sexual conduct cases studied involved charges that the defendant either employed actual 
force or threatened force involving a deadly weapon). In the absence of injury, many rape 
cases will necessarily rely on competing testimony about conduct and apparent consent. 
 195.  See JENNIFER TEMKIN & BARBARA KRAHÉ, SEXUAL ASSAULT AND THE JUSTICE GAP: 
A QUESTION OF ATTITUDE 11 (2008) (noting that, in a majority of the most severe sexual 
assaults reported in the British Crime Survey, the victim and perpetrator were intimates); 
Susan J. Lea, Ursula Lanvers & Steve Shaw, Attrition in Rape Cases: Developing a Profile 
and Identifying Relevant Factors, 43 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 583, 590 (2003) (noting that the 
victim and perpetrator are intimately related in twenty-four percent of reported cases and 
that they are acquaintances or relatives in fifty percent of the cases). 
 196.  TEMKIN & KRAHÉ, supra note 195, at 167-68. 
 197.  Id. at 129 (describing the ease with which defense barristers can undermine a 
nervous rape complainant’s credibility). 
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characteristics with the fact-finder is deeply troubling, suggesting a 
danger that the system will subtly but systematically privilege pow-
erful people with the right to sexually victimize the less-fortunate.198 
 As to the subjective fairness considerations, the analysis is more 
nuanced. In such suits, the ability of a victim to voice her complaint 
in an authoritative forum takes on particular importance, especially 
in light of the underwhelming success of the criminal justice system 
in obtaining convictions in rape cases.199 If police or prosecutors do 
not consider her case to be worth pursuing, a civil court may be the 
only forum in which the victim can express her grievance and seek an 
official declaration that she was wronged.200 And the accused defen-
dants, being publicly charged with breaching some of society’s bed-
rock norms, may have a profound desire to personally counter the 
accusations and confront the accuser.  
 Nevertheless, there are also strong subjective fairness reasons 
why we might wish to avoid a live rape trial. Many rape plaintiffs 
will have suffered substantial psychological trauma and may be very 
reluctant to be physically present in the same room with their at-
tacker.201 So although they might desire “voice” to the extent that 
they want to tell their story and have it recognized by legal officials, 
they may find the traditional trial environment more threatening 
and unpleasant than a deposition would be. So although there are 
still very real voice concerns in these cases, some of which (such as 
the defendant’s preferences) might still counsel in favor of a live trial, 
there are also subjective fairness reasons to favor a paper procedure. 
 The best way to handle such a situation—where accuracy concerns 
counsel strongly in favor of a paper trial, but where at least one liti-
gant may feel very dissatisfied with that mode of proceeding—is to go 
ahead with the paper trial while doing everything that is possible to 
make it palatable. As outlined above,202 the negative voice effects of 
paper-based procedure can be minimized via a number of methods. 
First, the court can try and provide alternative avenues for party ex-
pression, even if those opportunities do not directly contribute to the 
evidentiary basis of the decision. If trying to maximize the parties’ 
                                                            
 198.  Cf. Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 66 (2008) 
(noting that members of ethnic minority groups are “overrepresented . . . among rape . . . 
convicts,” and also that they are more likely to be exonerated for their crimes than is the 
norm among rape convicts). 
 199.  See Joan McGregor, Introduction to Symposium on Philosophical Issues in Rape Law, 
11 LAW & PHIL. 1, 2 (1992) (”The likelihood of a [rape] complaint actually ending in conviction 
is generally estimated at two to five percent.”); see also David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, 
Rape in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1209 (1997) 
(“The relatively few cases that proceed to trial often end with an acquittal or a hung jury.”). 
 200.  See Bublick, supra note 192, at 68. 
 201.  See Melanie Randall, Domestic Violence and the Construction of “Ideal Victims”: 
Assaulted Women’s “Image Problems” in Law, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 107, 136-37 (2004). 
 202.  See supra Part III. 
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trust in a paper-based procedure, a court could first encourage them 
to participate in a non-binding form of alternative dispute resolu-
tion—such as a summary jury trial203—in which they would be able to 
voice their disputes without biasing a decisionmaker who would issue 
a binding judgment in their case.204 If the parties do not settle after 
this initial exploration of their dispute,205 the court can explain the 
need for an absent procedure and seek the parties’ explicit consent, 
thus explicitly tying the procedure to a desire for fair adjudication. 
This may reduce the likelihood that the parties will perceive the 
court’s desire to dispense with a hearing as a signal of disrespect for 
the parties or as an indication that the court does not take their dis-
pute seriously. Next, after it has reached a view of the merits of the 
case based on the written submissions, the court could permit the 
parties to briefly articulate their claims in open court, if they wished, 
before announcing that decision. This will allow those parties who 
desire further opportunities for voice to speak directly to the court 
while minimizing the likelihood that their expressive opportunity 
will decrease the accuracy of the decision. Finally, when announcing 
its decision, the court should summarize the parties’ main arguments 
and testimony and then explain its reasons for accepting one account 
and rejecting the other, thus clearly indicating that it considered 
their written submissions with care. With such an approach, a court 
can assure that the decision is as accurate as possible while minimiz-
ing any loss of legitimacy that might arise from the use of a paper-
based procedure in such a delicate setting. 
 With these examples, a few things have hopefully become clear. 
Although the demeanor-evidence rationale for preferring live adjudi-
cation as a means of resolving evidentiary disputes has little to rec-
ommend it, there are many situations in which a live hearing is nev-
ertheless the best way to proceed. Indeed, at early stages of a lawsuit 
and in low-stakes cases, hearing-based procedures will usually be 
preferable to paper-based ones. But, in higher-stakes disputes with a 
                                                            
 203.  A summary jury trial is a “non-binding abbreviated trial[] by mock jurors who are 
chosen from the jury pool.” Donna Shestowsky, Improving Summary Jury Trials: Insights 
from Psychology, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 469, 470 (2003) (quotation marks omit-
ted). The goal is to have the summary jurors issue a verdict that can “provide the starting 
point for settlement negotiations.” Id. at 471. 
 204.  Ideally, such a procedure would incorporate protections for the privacy and trau-
ma of the plaintiff, such as separating the two parties so that they do not come into contact 
when they speak before the summary jurors. 
 205.  Note that the concern discussed above—that settlement would harm parties by 
excluding voice opportunities—could be mitigated here, if the summary jury procedure was 
modified to incorporate opportunities for the parties to testify briefly. Cf. id. at 472 & n.13 
(noting that live witness testimony is normally not employed at a summary trial, but that 
it is an option that lawyers sometimes elect); Thomas R. Mulroy, Jr. & Andrea B. Fried-
lander, Trial Techniques: A Discussion of Summary Jury Trials and the Use of Mock Ju-
ries, 24 TORT & INS. L.J. 563, 564 (1989) (noting that lawyers can chose to present live wit-
ness testimony “in abbreviated form”). 
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well-developed record and an incentive to extensively prepare for a 
hearing, both accuracy and cost considerations start to favor paper 
procedures, and the overall decision becomes more nuanced. In some 
cases, if credibility is of less importance but the need of the court to 
comprehend complex evidence is a more pressing concern, a hearing 
may still be preferable. But in cases in which credibility is a central 
concern and a great deal rides on the accuracy of the outcome, it may 
be best for courts to employ paper-based procedures if they are available, 
in order to avoid the biasing effects of witness demeanor and appearance, 
while attending carefully to the consequences of such an approach on 
participant and observer assessments of procedural fairness.  
F.   Implications for Law Reform 
 The above analysis suggests that in some respects, such as our 
tendency to use oral hearings to resolve very small cases, or the pref-
erence of some courts for oral evidentiary hearings at the preliminary 
injunction stage, our legal systems are striking an appropriate bal-
ance between the accuracy, the perceived fairness, and the costs of 
fact-finding procedures. In other respects, however, our approach to 
fact-finding in civil cases seems upside-down. Most notably, paper-
based fact-finding is rarest at the end of cases, which is precisely 
when it is likely to be most useful. Moreover, courts faced with choos-
ing between live and paper-based procedures often fall back on the 
faulty premise that credibility conflicts favor live hearings, when in 
fact they favor a paper-based approach. So, there is clearly a large 
amount of room for improvement.  
 Luckily, actors at all levels of the legal system can make choices 
that will help remedy the defects of our present system. Lawyers can 
get better justice at lower cost by attending to the real costs and ben-
efits of these differing approaches to fact-finding and by asking for 
procedures that will actually serve their interests. Judges, likewise, 
can exercise their discretion to hold more live evidentiary hearings 
early on in the evolution of cases, when they will be most useful. On 
the flip-side, judges should be more willing to employ paper-based 
procedures at the trial stage, especially if the parties have consented 
to them, even if the controversy involves credibility disputes. Their 
freedom to do so may be limited by the practical constraints of the 
jury trial process, but they should feel freer to experiment with pa-
per-based fact-finding in lieu of bench trials. 
 Much of the blame for the present situation must lie with rule-
makers, however. The complex policies in this arena no doubt make 
it hard to write categorical rules requiring live fact-finding in some 
settings and a paper-based process in others. But other approaches 
would improve on the current model. Let us consider, for example, 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. These rules are mostly silent 
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regarding how pretrial fact-finding is to be conducted when it is nec-
essary,206 and Rule 43(c) suggests that judges may choose freely be-
tween affidavits, depositions, and oral testimony when finding facts 
during motion practice.207 Moreover, they suggest (although they do 
not explicitly state) that paper trials are improper: Rule 43(a) re-
quires that, “[a]t trial, the witnesses’ testimony must be taken in 
open court,”208 and Rule 52 instructs that “[i]n an action tried on the 
facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court must find the 
facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately.”209 Al-
though some judges read the language of Rule 52 to permit paper tri-
als,210 the phrase “tried on the facts” seems to invoke Rule 43’s man-
date of oral proof at trial, and (perhaps because of these doubts), 
courts generally proceed to try cases on paper only by consent of both 
parties, requiring in effect a waiver of the right to an oral trial.211 
 A better approach would give trial judges explicit discretion to 
choose between the two procedures in all fact-finding settings, thus 
allowing room for judges to decide between the procedures on a case 
by case basis. At the same time, such a rule should provide guidance 
as to which factors weigh in favor of each approach, given the poor 
state of judicial intuitions on this subject. Finally, given the signifi-
cant accuracy and cost advantages that can often be attained by using 
a paper trial, the rules should allow courts to dispense with live pro-
cedures in some cases where both parties do not consent to the proce-
dure. A good rule might provide as follows: 
(1). At all stages of cases tried to the bench, or when pretrial fact-
finding is necessary in jury-trial cases, the court may find facts 
based either based on paper submissions (which may include affi-
davits, deposition testimony, and documentary evidence) or based 
                                                            
 206.  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12 (setting forth a number of pretrial motions that can 
result in the dismissal of a case, some of which require factual proof, but giving no guid-
ance as to how such facts should be demonstrated); FED. R. CIV. P. 19 (similarly silent as to 
the method of proving the facts necessary to support dismissals for failure to join necessary 
parties); FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (silent as to how parties should prove the factual basis for class 
action certification); FED. R. CIV. P. 37 (silent as to how parties should prove the existence 
of discovery violations when seeking sanctions); FED. R. CIV. P. 65 (referring to preliminary 
injunction “hearing[s]” but not specifying whether they should involve testimony or wheth-
er argument on affidavit evidence is sufficient). The primary exception to this silence is 
Rule 56, which provides that parties seeking summary judgment should show the absence 
of disputed facts using paper submissions of affidavits and depositions. But this is the ex-
ception that proves the rule, because motions for summary judgment do not require the 
court to engage in actual fact-finding, but rather require only the identification of factual 
disputes. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). 
 207.  FED. R. CIV. P. 43(c) (“When a motion relies on facts outside the record, the court may 
hear the matter on affidavits or may hear it wholly or partly on oral testimony or on depositions.”). 
 208.    Id. 43(a). 
 209.    Id. 52(a)(1). 
 210.  See Denlow, supra note 37, at 31, 34 n.6. (collecting cases).  
 211.  See, e.g., id.; Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Jostens, Inc., 155 F.3d 140, 142-3 (2d Cir. 
1998); see also Market Street Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 590 (7th Cir. 1991). 
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on live witness testimony. 
(2). In exercising its discretion to choose between these methods of 
proof, the court should be guided by the following principles: 
(a) Early in a case, live testimony is usually preferable for rea-
sons of cost and clarity. 
(b) Later in a case, including at the trial stage, paper proof will 
often be more accurate and less expensive. 
(c) To the extent that credibility disputes arise, a paper procedure 
is likely to be more accurate than an oral one. Therefore, a desire 
to observe the demeanor of witnesses when making credibility 
determinations is not a proper reason to order live presentation. 
(d) The joint consent of the parties to either mode of evidence 
presentation counsels strongly in favor of that method, but is 
not dispositive. 
(e) The court may allow a brief statement from each party be-
fore issuing its decision in a paper trial case, in order to give 
aggrieved litigants an opportunity to address the court directly 
without undue risk of biasing the resulting decision.  
Although an admittedly radical change from present practice, such a rule 
would do a much better job balancing accuracy, satisfaction, and costs 
than the approach currently embodied in federal rules and practice. 
VII.   CONCLUSION 
 As we have seen, the conventional wisdom regarding live eviden-
tiary hearings and trials—that they increase the accuracy of deci-
sions by allowing fact-finders to use witness demeanor to make better 
credibility calls—is wrong. In fact, the live appearance of witnesses 
has a much larger downside than judges or commentators have pre-
viously appreciated; in addition to the fact that demeanor cues gen-
erally impair, rather than aid, credibility judgments, there are a 
number of cognitive biases that may arise from having one’s first im-
pressions of a witness be visual and auditory impressions. These in-
clude a persistent human tendency to trust or distrust witnesses 
based on their physical attractiveness, their social status, their race, 
or other features that may make them similar to, or different than, 
the decisionmaker.  
 But the fact that live testimony rarely aids credibility judgments 
does not make it useless. Sometimes live presentation allows for more 
effective witness examination—although this opportunity will grow less 
likely if a witness is well prepared to rebut cross-examination questions. 
More commonly, a hearing or trial provides a forum in which a judge 
can interact with witnesses, enabling her to cut through confusion or 
evasion with her own questioning. In addition, live proceedings often feel 
fairer to participants than paper-based decisions, due in large part to 
the desire to have expressive input in decisions that affect us. And some-
times a live hearing may be preferable for reasons of cost or practicality. 
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 In the end, it would be naïve to suggest that one procedure is pref-
erable to the other in all possible circumstances. Instead, when decid-
ing which procedure to favor, a decisionmaker—whether it be a law-
yer deciding what to ask for, a judge exercising a discretionary choice 
between alternatives, or a rulemaker trying to guide or constrain 
that discretion—should attend to the situational costs and benefits of 
each procedure. In general, live procedures will be more useful early 
in the life of a case, and in low-value, highly cost-constrained cases, 
whereas paper procedures will usually be preferable for late-stage 
fact-finding. This means that the dominant approach to fact-finding 
in American civil procedure—in which a largely paper-based pretrial 
process is followed by a live trial—has little to recommend it. Al-
though the constitutional right to a jury trial may place limits on our 
ability to design a better system, one obvious reform implication is to 
give trial courts the discretion to choose freely between live hearings 
and paper trials in cases tried to the bench, and encourage them to 
use each procedure when it is most advantageous. To that end, I hope 
the enumeration of relevant policy factors in this Article, as well as a 
proposed rule to implement those factors into day-to-day court deci-
sionmaking, may serve some use. 
 
